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P-Values, Priors, and Procedure in
Antidiscrimination Law
JASON R. BENT†
INTRODUCTION
A recent, high-profile article in Nature questioned
scientific journals’ continued practice of publishing
statistically significant findings of hypothesis testing
studies.1 The article was sharply critical of stubborn
overreliance on p-values, and posited that “[m]ost scientists
would look at” study results with a “P value of .01 and say
that there was just a 1% chance of [the] result being a false
alarm.”2 Those scientists would be wrong.
Hopefully, this claim in the Nature article is overly
pessimistic. One would expect that most research scientists
have a sufficient understanding of statistics to avoid falling

† Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; J.D., University
of Michigan Law School (2000); B.A., Grinnell College (1997). This paper is the
second in a series of two papers addressing the influence of priors in systemic
disparate treatment discrimination law. The first paper, Hidden Priors: Toward
a Unifying Theory of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 807
(forthcoming 2015), was selected for presentation and publication as part of a
symposium hosted by the Denver University Law Review in January 2014,
entitled Revisiting Sex: Gender and Sex Discrimination Fifty Years After the Civil
Rights Act. The concepts advanced in this paper were refined as a result of
comments received at the Denver University Law Review symposium, the 2012
Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and the 2012
Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law, and
the suggestions of Charlotte Alexander, Kingsley Browne, Regina Nuzzo, Gowri
Ramachandran, Charles A. Sullivan, Louis Virelli III, Steven Willborn, and
Michael J. Zimmer. Both papers in this series benefited from the research
assistance of Michael Labbee and Lindsay Houser. The faculty and
administration of the Stetson University College of Law generously supported
this research project.
1. See Regina Nuzzo, Scientific Method: Statistical Errors, 506 NATURE 151
(Feb. 12, 2014), available at www.nature.com/news/scientific-method-statisticalerrors-1.14700.
2. Id. at 151.
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into this trap, often called the transposition fallacy.3 Then
again, there is reason for pessimism. In a classic study of
Harvard Medical School physicians and students, 45% of the
respondents were fooled by the transposition fallacy when
considering the following question:
One in a thousand people has a prevalence for a particular heart
disease. There is a test to detect this disease. The test is 100%
accurate for people who have the disease and is 95% accurate for
those who don’t (this means that 5% of the people who do not have
the disease will be wrongly diagnosed as having it). If a randomly
selected person tests positive what is the probability that the
person actually has the disease?4

Almost half of the respondents incorrectly answered
95%, which strongly suggests that those respondents
succumbed to the transposition fallacy.5 The correct answer,
when calculated using Bayes’s Theorem to account for the
3. The common error identified in the Nature article is referred to by several
alternate names, including the transposition fallacy, the fallacy of the transposed
conditional, and the prosecutor’s fallacy (in reference to cases involving DNA
matching evidence). See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The
Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 33, 52 (2000). This fallacy is discussed at length in Jason R. Bent,
Hidden Priors: Toward a Unifying Theory of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law,
91 DENV. U. L. REV. 807 (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Bent, Hidden Priors]. It
may be thought of as a specific instance of what is often called the base rate fallacy
in the field of cognitive psychology, referring to the tendency of subjects to
underweight the relevance of background knowledge. See generally Louis Kaplow,
Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1265 n.210 (2013) (citing,
among others, Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments,
44 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 211 (1980), and Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On
the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973)).
4. Ward Casscells et al., Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory
Results, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 999, 999 (1978); see also Norman Fenton & Martin
Neil, Comparing Risks of Alternative Medical Diagnosis Using Bayesian
Arguments, 43 J. BIOMED. INFORMATICS 485, 485 (2010) [hereinafter Fenton &
Neil, Comparing Risks]; Bailey Kuklin, Probability Misestimates in Medical Care,
59 ARK. L. REV. 527, 528-29 (2006); James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of
Things Not Seen: Non-Matches as Evidence of Innocence, 98 IOWA L. REV. 577, 675
(2013).
5. See Fenton & Neil, Comparing Risks, supra note 4, at 486 (“When people
give a high answer, like 95%, they are falling victim to a very common fallacy
known as the ‘base-rate neglect’ fallacy; people neglect to take into consideration
the very low probability (of having the disease) that forms the vital starting
point.”).
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base rate prevalence of the disease, is approximately 2%.6
Only 18% of the Harvard Medical School study respondents
correctly provided this answer.7
As the Nature article points out, statistically significant
research results with p-values of .01 or .05 do not tell the
whole story, because they ignore the critical factor of “how
plausible the hypothesis is in the first place.”8 Even if the
Nature article is overly pessimistic on the proportion of
scientists that would fall victim to the transposition fallacy,
the article still raises very troubling questions for the legal
profession: if scientists or doctors have difficulty properly
interpreting p-values, what would most judges or lawyers say
about the meaning of a p-value of .01?9 How would most
jurors interpret a p-value of .01?
These are crucial questions for cases involving statistical
evidence, including systemic employment discrimination
cases. A fundamental misunderstanding of the meaning of pvalues and statistical significance has infected employment
discrimination law since the late 1970s, when statistical
evidence of employment disparities first came to be accepted
6. See, e.g., Casscells et al., supra note 4, at 999-1000; Fenton & Neil,
Comparing Risks, supra note 4, at 485; Kuklin, supra note 4, at 528 n.1. This
result can be easily shown with a visual representation of the problem, infra Part
III, Question 3, sec. D, fig. A.
7. See, e.g., Casscells et al., supra note 4, at 1000; Kuklin, supra note 4, at 529
n.1.
8. Nuzzo, supra note 1, at 151.
9. In his review of relevant cases, Professor Kingsley Browne identified
examples from “virtually all the circuits” involving the commission of the
transposition fallacy, suggesting that many (probably most) judges and jurors
would be susceptible to the error identified in the Nature article and illustrated
in the Harvard Medical School study. See Kingsley R. Browne, The Strangely
Persistent “Transposition Fallacy”: Why “Statistically Significant” Evidence of
Discrimination May Not Be Significant, 14 LAB. LAW. 437, 447 (1998) [hereinafter
Browne, Strangely Persistent]; Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of
Discrimination: Beyond “Damned Lies,” 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 490-93 (1993)
[hereinafter Browne, Statistical Proof]. Lawyers as a group are notoriously bad
with mathematics. Lisa Milot, Illuminating Innumeracy, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
769, 769 (2013) (“It is an open secret that lawyers don’t like math. Tales of lawyers
who chose the profession over business or medicine at least in part because of
discomfort with math are legion, as are reports of math avoidance by lawyers once
in the profession.”).
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as a means of establishing a prima facie case of systemic
employment discrimination by the Supreme Court.10 This
misunderstanding also infected the Supreme Court’s most
recent systemic employment discrimination decision in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.11
The Court’s systemic disparate treatment doctrine
condones the use of p-values to test for statistical significance
without adequately considering “how plausible the
hypothesis [of unlawful discrimination] is in the first place.” 12
This misuse of traditional hypothesis testing and p-values
has, for years, covered up the opaque operation of hidden,
unstated, and unexamined “priors”—assumptions about the
prevalence, or base rate, of unlawful discrimination.13 It is
time to bring the unstated assumptions into the open in
systemic discrimination cases. Just as many scientists and
statisticians have argued that the time has come for a
Bayesian revolution in scientific research,14 so too has the
10. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-12 (1977);
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-41 (1977); Browne,
Statistical Proof, supra note 9, at 482-83, 503-505; Browne, Strangely Persistent,
supra note 9, at 437, 441-42; see also 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.01 (3d ed. 2002).
11. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
12. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
13. See Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 840-47.
14. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Subconsciously, Athletes May Play Like
Statisticians, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at F1 (“‘In academia, the Bayesian
revolution is on the verge of becoming the majority viewpoint, which would have
been unthinkable ten years ago,’ said Bradley P. Carlin, a professor of public
health at the University of Minnesota and a Bayesian specialist.”); see also John
K. Kruschke, An Open Letter to Editors of Journals, Chairs of Departments,
Directors of Funding Programs, Directors of Graduate Training, Reviewers of
Grants and Manuscripts, Researchers, Teachers, and Students, 2, 5,
http://www.indiana.edu/~kruschke/AnOpenLetter.pdf (last accessed Oct. 20,
2014) (“The point is simple: Bayesian methods are being adopted across the
disciplines of science. We should not be laggards in utilizing Bayesian methods in
our science, or in teaching Bayesian methods in our classrooms. . . . Science is
moving to Bayesian methods because of their many advantages, both practical
and intellectual, over 20th century [null hypothesis significance testing]. It is time
that we convert our research and educational practices to Bayesian data
analysis.”); see generally Mark A. Beaumont & Bruce Rannala, The Bayesian
Revolution in Genetics, 5 NATURE REV. GENETICS 251 (2004); Stephen P. Brooks,
Bayesian Computation: A Statistical Revolution, 361 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE
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time finally come for a Bayesian revolution in employment
discrimination law.
This is the second paper in a two-part series advancing a
Bayesian approach to systemic disparate treatment law. The
first paper, Hidden Priors,15 argued that reliance on
traditional hypothesis testing statistics in systemic disparate
treatment cases does not remove the influence of hidden prior
assumptions about the prevalence of discrimination, but
instead just conceals the influence of unstated assumptions
beneath a veneer of doctrinal reasoning, statistical
significance tests, and p-values.16 Hidden Priors advocated
for the use of Bayesian statistical analysis to bring the
influence of priors to light, and challenged “courts and
scholars to openly acknowledge the importance of priors in
evaluating systemic discrimination cases, so that discussion
of the difficult challenges we face in managing priors can
begin.”17
At the conclusion of Hidden Priors, I acknowledged those
“difficult challenges” in managing priors that seem to leave
courts and legal scholars reluctant to embrace Bayesian
analysis in systemic discrimination cases. I then laid out an
agenda for tackling those challenges by way of a scholarly
discussion of several second-order questions:
1. Whose priors matter? Possible answers include the
trial judge, the trial fact-finder, appellate judges,
and the legislature.
2. Relatedly, how should evaluation of priors fit into
civil litigation pretrial procedure, including key
dispositive procedures such as motions to dismiss
and motions for summary judgment?
3. How can Bayesian statistical inference be presented
to fact-finders at trial?
4. What are legitimate or illegitimate sources of priors?
ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON, SERIES A: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL & ENGINEERING SCI.
2681 (2003).
15. See Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 840-42.
16. Id. at 810.
17. Id. at 851.
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Here, potential answers range from pure
unsupported guesses to empirical evidence on
background rates of discrimination to expert
testimony about social framework causes of
discrimination. Which sources are legitimate?
Should some sources receive more deference than
others?18
This second paper offers my views on the best available—
though admittedly imperfect—answers to these questions. I
contend that our answers to these questions should be guided
by the institutional strengths of the various entities involved
in our civil litigation system. Legislatures, trial judges,
appellate judges, and juries each play different roles in our
civil justice system, and those roles are designed to capitalize
on their institutional strengths and minimize the effects of
their institutional weaknesses. Bearing those institutional
characteristics in mind, sensible and functional decisions can
be made about the assignment of responsibilities for
estimating and constraining priors. Our system of civil
justice and our rules of civil procedure are generally designed
to assign responsibilities to those institutions in the best
position to act on questions of law or fact, and they can
similarly assign responsibilities for the estimation of priors.
This concept of incorporating Bayesian priors into the
ordinary civil litigation process is not fanciful or
unprecedented. Rather, employment discrimination scholars
can draw upon a body of legal and social science scholarship
and judicial precedent in other areas of substantive law.
Specifically, courts and scholars have long considered the
implications of Bayesian statistical analysis in making
paternity determinations and interpreting DNA evidence in
criminal prosecutions.
Part I of this Article briefly outlines the current legal
framework
of
systemic
disparate
treatment
antidiscrimination law. Part II sketches the problem of
acknowledging and estimating priors in the context of
systemic employment discrimination cases. In doing so, Part
II contends that imperfect solutions to prior estimation are
nonetheless preferable to the status quo. Even imperfect,
unsatisfying Bayesian solutions make the operation of priors
18. Id. at 849-50.
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transparent when evaluating statistical evidence. Having set
out the problem of priors, Part III turns to the specific secondorder questions posed above. Tackling each of the four
second-order questions, Part III argues that a sensible
solution to prior management must capitalize on the
institutional strengths of each component of the civil justice
system. Finally, Part IV considers some pragmatic
limitations that may counsel against application of express
Bayesian analysis in antidiscrimination cases beyond
systemic disparate treatment cases. Part IV also briefly
charts a course for further scholarly discourse on the
integration of prior probabilities in systemic discrimination
law.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT
DOCTRINE
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination “because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”19 In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court,
recognizing that direct proof of intentional discrimination is
often unavailable to plaintiffs, identified the “pattern or
practice”—or systemic disparate treatment—method of
proving unlawful discrimination.20 This systemic disparate
treatment theory is not spelled out in the statute, but instead
was formed by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title
VII.21 The systemic disparate treatment theory is distinct
19. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended in
scattered portions of 42 U.S.C., primarily 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2010)).
20. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)
(describing the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), as only one method of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination in violation of Title VII).
21. In laying out a proof structure for systemic disparate treatment, or “pattern
or practice” cases, the Teamsters Court drew upon language found in Section 707
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (2010). This
subsection originally granted the Attorney General the authority to investigate
and act upon a charge of a “pattern or practice of discrimination.” Id. That
authority was subsequently transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) in 1972. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat, 103, 107, § 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)
(2010)).
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from the individual disparate treatment theory, epitomized
by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green22 and the disparate
impact theory, first recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.23
The two cases that first recognized and defined the
systemic disparate treatment theory were International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States24 and Hazelwood
School District v. United States.25 Both cases permitted proof
of a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination through
statistical evidence, relying on this famous central premise:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case
such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign
of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to
be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time
result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and
ethnic composition of the population in the community from which
employees are hired.26

The Teamsters Court set out a two-phase proof
framework for systemic disparate treatment cases. In Phase
I, plaintiffs may make out a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing “that unlawful discrimination has
been a regular procedure or policy followed by an
employer . . . .”27 The Court made clear that statistical
evidence could be used to make this Phase I showing.28 This
statistical evidence may be combined with the anecdotal
testimony of some affected individuals to bring the “cold
22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
24. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
25. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
26. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20 (emphasis added); see also Browne,
Statistical Proof, supra note 9, at 503-05; Paul Meier et al., What Happened in
Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, in
STATISTICS AND THE LAW 20-21 (Morris H. DeGroot et. al. eds., 1986) (arguing that
this central premise, taken literally, is not tenable, but may be viewed as an
aspirational statement of impartiality).
27. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
28. Id. at 339 (“‘[S]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an
important role’ in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed
issue.”) (quoting Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 620
(1974)).
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numbers convincingly to life.”29 Upon a successful prima facie
showing by the plaintiffs, “[t]he burden then shifts to the
employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a pattern or
practice by demonstrating that the [plaintiff’s] proof is either
inaccurate or insignificant.”30 If the defendant fails to defeat
the prima facie showing of a pattern or practice of
discrimination in Phase I, then the plaintiffs are entitled to
prospective relief, such as an injunctive order.31 In Phase II,
plaintiffs may seek individual relief. A successful showing by
plaintiffs in Phase I creates a rebuttable presumption that
the employer’s pattern or practice of discrimination affected
each individual claimant for purposes of determining
individual relief in Phase II.32
In Hazelwood, the Court’s second systemic disparate
treatment case, the Court reiterated its approval of the use
of statistical evidence.33 The Court, citing Teamsters, stated
that “[w]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they
alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a
pattern or practice of discrimination.”34
29. Id. at 339.
30. Id. at 360.
31. Id. at 361.
32. Allan G. King, “Gross Statistical Disparities” as Evidence of a Pattern and
Practice of Discrimination: Statistical Versus Legal Significance, 22 LAB. LAW.
271, 282 (2007) (“[T]he presumption created primarily by this statistical proof
applies to each and every class member and requires the employer to rebut that
presumption in each specific instance.”).
33. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09.
34. Id. at 307-08 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339); see also Michael Selmi,
Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32
BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 480 (2011) (early systemic disparate treatment cases
were “almost entirely statistical in nature”). After Hazelwood, lower courts have
frequently acknowledged that a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment
discrimination may be established by statistical evidence alone. See, e.g., E.E.O.C.
v. Olson’s Dairy Queens, Inc., 989 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1993) (relying on
statistical comparisons alone to reverse district court’s decision that no prima
facie case had been established under the Teamsters framework); Satchell v.
FedEx Express, No. C 03-2659 SI, 2006 WL 3507913, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006)
(plaintiffs can prove their prima facie case “with or without anecdotal testimony”);
McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2004)
(“Plaintiffs may sustain their burden at the prima facie stage exclusively on
statistical evidence, for ‘no sound policy reason exists for subjecting the plaintiff
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The Hazelwood Court endorsed the use of a statistical
technique known as binomial distribution analysis (or
standard deviation analysis) to show the required “gross
statistical disparities.”35 A binomial distribution analysis
compares the difference between the expected and observed
number of hires from a relevant labor pool. If the observed
number of people hired in the protected category (race, sex,
etc.) is “greater than two or three standard deviations” from
the expected number of hires from that protected group, then
the hypothesis that applicants were hired without regard to
the protected characteristic can be treated as suspect.36
Following Teamsters and Hazelwood, “a flood of
statistical tests of significance, confidence intervals, and
multiple regressions thundered forth from the lower
courts.”37 Several years later, in 1986, the Court first
approved the use of multiple regression analysis, a more
sophisticated statistical methodology, to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.38 The Court’s most recent
systemic disparate treatment case was its 2011 decision in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which involved the use of
regression statistics in an attempt to establish a nationwide
class of female victims of discrimination in pay and
promotions at Wal-Mart stores.39
to the additional requirement of either providing anecdotal evidence or showing
gross disparities.’”) (quoting Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
35. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08.
36. Id. at 308 n.14 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17
(1977)).
37. Meier et al., supra note 26, at 3. Systemic theories are a high priority in
the EEOC’s enforcement strategy. The EEOC’s Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years
2012-2016 emphasizes the importance of systemic cases and contains
performance measures based on the number of systemic cases. See generally
EEOC, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2016, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/strategic_plan_12to16.cfm.
38. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398-403 (1986) (involving a claim of
salary discrimination).
39. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011); see also Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out
Pattern or Practice After Wal-Mart: The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 10708 (2013) (describing plaintiffs’ claims in Wal-Mart); Joseph A. Seiner,
Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2014) (acknowledging
the general perception among academics that Wal-Mart weakened the
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Statistical evidence, particularly binomial distribution
and multiple regression analyses, remains the cornerstone of
most systemic discrimination cases.40 Basing liability
decisions on these traditional statistical methods (without
acknowledging the influence of priors) is problematic, for the
reasons illustrated by the Nature article. These traditional
statistical methods can generate a statistically significant pvalue, but without information about how likely or unlikely
any given hypothesis is before observing the statistical
evidence, these traditional tests of statistical significance
cannot tell the court much about the actual likelihood of the
hypothesis–unlawful discrimination. The Nature article puts
it this way:
Most scientists would look at [a] P value of 0.01 and say that there
was just a 1% chance of [the study’s] result being a false alarm. But
they would be wrong. The P value cannot say this: all it can do is
summarize the data assuming a specific null hypothesis. It cannot
work backwards and make statements about the underlying
reality. That requires another piece of information: the odds that a
real effect was there in the first place. To ignore this would be like
waking up with a headache and concluding that you have a rare
brain tumour—possible, but so unlikely that it requires a lot more
evidence to supersede an everyday explanation such as an allergic
reaction.41

The other “piece of information” described in the Nature
article is the prior probability. For purposes of evaluating
statistical evidence in employment discrimination cases, it is
the prior probability that the employer engaged in
discrimination.
Traditional
statistical
analyses
of
employment outcome disparities can provide the p-value for
substantive civil rights protections of Title VII and exploring potential ways to
minimize Wal-Mart’s impact); Stephanie S. Silk, Note, More Decentralization,
Less Liability: The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Claims in the Wake of
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 637, 641 (2013) (describing the statistical
evidence offered by plaintiffs in Wal-Mart).
40. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 145-55 (7th ed. 2008); Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci’s Dicta:
Signaling a New Standard for Affirmative Action Under Title VII?, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 241, 249 n.59 (identifying binomial distribution and multiple
regression as the two types of statistical analysis approved by the Supreme
Court); Meier et. al., supra note 26, at 3; Selmi, supra note 34, at 485.
41. Nuzzo, supra note 1, at 151.
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the observed disparities, when testing the null hypothesis of
completely random employment decisions, but they cannot
“work backwards” to indicate just how likely it is that the
employer in question actually discriminated. 42 The next Part
considers the problem of estimating or specifying a prior
probability in the employment discrimination context.
II. THE PRIOR PROBLEM: WHY IMPERFECT BAYESIAN
SOLUTIONS ARE SUPERIOR TO THE STATUS QUO
Hidden Priors, along with works by other scholars,
including Ramona Paetzold43 and Deborah Weiss,44 make the
case for a Bayesian approach to the use and interpretation of
statistical evidence in systemic disparate treatment law.
That case will not be repeated here, and the reader’s general
familiarity with that argument will be presumed.
Nevertheless, one point bears reemphasizing before
considering the second-order questions to be addressed in
Part III: the superiority of imperfect Bayesian solutions over
the status quo.
As others have noted, the primary argument leveled
against a Bayesian approach to statistical evidence in the
litigation context is the difficulty of estimating or specifying
prior probabilities.45 But the status quo approach to systemic
42. See Browne, Statistical Proof, supra note 9, at 488 (“[T]he probability that
an employer’s work-force disparities are a consequence of chance is completely
dependent upon a statistic which the courts never have: the likelihood of
discrimination prior to making the employment decision. Although one might
attempt some estimate of the percentage of employers who engage in systematic
discrimination, the estimate could be no more than the crudest approximation.”).
43. See, e.g., Ramona L. Paetzold, Problems with Statistical Significance in
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 395 (1991).
44. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination
Law, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1677 (2011).
45. See, e.g., David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The
Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 572 (2004) (“For a variety of reasons, Bayesians are
criticized for their reliance on such uniform [prior] distributions as a justifiable
starting point for Bayesian analysis.”); Norman Fenton & Martin Neil, Avoiding
Probabilistic Reasoning Fallacies in Legal Practice using Bayesian Networks,
AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. (forthcoming 2011) (draft at 9-10), available at http://www.
eecs.qmul.ac.uk/~norman/papers/fenton_neil_prob_fallacies_June2011web.pdf
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disparate treatment law—using traditional hypothesis
testing “statistical significance” to impose liability and shift
burdens of proof onto the defendant46—involves a misleading
application of p-values in a context for which they were never
intended,47 and obscures hidden assumptions about the
prevalence of discrimination.48 Decision rules turning on
statistically significant results from traditional hypothesis
testing necessarily involve a built-in, unstated, and
unexamined assumption about the prevalence, or base rate,
of discrimination—a hidden prior.49 Even imperfect Bayesian
solutions have the benefit of making the specification of the

[hereinafter Fenton & Neil, Probabilistic Reasoning] (referring to “the obligation
to consider a prior probability for a hypothesis like ‘guilty’” as “one of the most
commonly cited objections to Bayes Theorem”); Kristy L. Fields, Toward a
Bayesian Analysis of Recanted Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1769, 1792 (2013) (“The choice of prior and the feasibility of using
probabilistic statistics in jury trials have been hotly contested topics in both
Bayesian and Bayesioskeptic camps.”); Kruschke, supra note 14, at 3 (“Some
people may have the mistaken impression that the advantages of Bayesian
methods are negated by the need to specify a prior distribution.”); Richard
Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 B.U.
L. REV. 439, 463 (1986) (“What then is the proper prior? This is, of course, the
sticking point in all attempts to apply a Bayesian approach to real world
decisionmaking.”); Marcel C. Garaud, Comment, Legal Standards and Statistical
Proof in Title VII Litigation: In Search of a Coherent Disparate Impact Model, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 455, 497, 501-03 (1990) (noting the difficulty of quantifying a prior
distribution, but urging a Bayesian approach to disparate impact liability).
46. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398-400 (1986); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-09 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360-61 (1977).
47. See Nuzzo, supra note 1, at 150-51 (“The irony is that when UK statistician
Ronald Fisher introduced the P value in the 1920s, he did not mean it to be a
definitive test. He intended it simply as an informal way to judge whether
evidence was significant in the old-fashioned sense: worthy of a second look. The
idea was to run an experiment, then see if the results were consistent with what
random chance might produce.”).
48. See generally Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 840-42.
49. See Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 840 (quoting RAMONA L.
PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION: USING
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES § 12.05, at 12-13 (Thomson West
2009)); see also Weiss, supra note 44, at 1689-93.
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prior transparent, a feature that makes such imperfect
solutions superior to the status quo.50
Still, one might ask whether the project of trying to
specify, incorporate, and manage prior probabilities in
systemic disparate treatment litigation is feasible or
advisable. After all, as Professor Kingsley Browne argues,
the true base rate of discrimination is something that courts
“never have” and, in his view, estimates of the base rate
“could be no more than the crudest approximation.”51
Professor Browne is correct that, at least given current
data and technology, estimates of base rates of
discrimination will be crude approximations. But, as I have
previously argued elsewhere, there are at least some possible
sources for developing base rate estimates.52 Admittedly,
none of the potential sources for estimating prior
probabilities are perfect methods for identifying true base
rates. But consider the only two other alternatives. The
traditional (or frequentist) approach used today, under the
Teamsters and Hazelwood framework, operates with a
hidden, built-in, unexamined prior.53 There is no reason to
suppose that this unexamined prior is any more accurate
than a prior probability distribution that might be
imperfectly selected by a court, an expert witness, or a factfinder that affirmatively focused on the question of specifying
50. See Kruschke, supra note 14, at 3 (“In fact, the use of a prior is both
appropriate for rational inference and advantageous in practical
applications. . . . It is inappropriate not to use a prior.”); see also Stephen Charest,
Bayesian Approaches to the Precautionary Principle, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F.
265, 291 (2002) (“[T]he Bayesian approach has characteristics that make it a more
appropriate means of assessing even truly uncertain risks than its methodological
rivals. Bayesian techniques are more transparent than classical hypothesis
testing, and are consistent with well-established scientific principles such as
falsifiability and simplicity when used to compare rival scientific hypotheses.”).
51. See Browne, Statistical Proof, supra note 9, at 488.
52. See Jason R. Bent, The Telltale Sign of Discrimination: Probabilities,
Information Asymmetries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory, 44 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 797, 798, 834 (2011) [hereinafter Bent, Telltale Sign] (pointing
to empirical studies of employment discrimination litigation outcomes as well as
various theoretical bases as possible sources from which prior probabilities might
be estimated).
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

2015]

P-VALUES, PRIORS, AND PROCEDURE

99

a prior. Avoiding the prior probability question and
maintaining the status quo approach to systemic disparate
treatment cases only creates the illusion of objectivity by
ignoring the base rate problem altogether.54 An admittedly
crude but deliberate approximation surely beats an
unexamined and unspoken assumption.
The second alternative would be to completely discard
the idea of proving systemic discrimination with statistical
evidence of disparities in employment outcomes. This
appears to be Professor Browne’s favored approach, 55 but it
has not been widely accepted, as demonstrated by courts’
continuing acknowledgement of the importance of statistical
evidence.56 Courts have good reason not to completely reject
statistical evidence of employment outcome disparities as
irrelevant. Statistical analyses, including binomial
distributions, multiple regressions, and perhaps someday an
emerging technique known as potential outcomes (sometimes
called “matching” or “causal inference”),57 all tell us
54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
55. See Browne, Statistical Proof, supra note 9, at 553-54 (“Hypothesis testing,
with its reliance on the assumption that the resultant p-value represents the
probability that the observed distribution was a consequence of chance and its
declaration of results as ‘statistically significant,’ should be abandoned
altogether. Such evidence is simply irrelevant to the ultimate question.”).
Elsewhere, Browne appears to acknowledge the possibility of a continuing role for
statistical evidence, but only where “substantially more rigorous criteria” are
applied. Id. at 554. He contends that if statistical analyses are to be used, courts
should require that they show “gross statistical disparities,” rather than just
ordinary statistical significance (often set at the .05 level), that they be
accompanied by “strong[ ] anecdotal evidence” of discrimination, and that courts
adhere to proper allocations of burdens of proof. See id. at 542, 549, 554. Professor
Browne concludes: “If statistical proof of discrimination is still to be acceptable at
all in court—which is perhaps doubtful—courts must pay more than lip service to
the principle that throughout the litigation it is the plaintiff’s burden to
demonstrate that impermissible discrimination is ‘the company’s standard
operating procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.’” Id. at 555
(quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)).
56. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Olson’s Dairy Queens, Inc., 989 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir.
1993); Satchell v. FedEx Express, No. C 03-2659 SI, 2006 WL 3507913, at *1-2
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006); McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., 349 F. Supp. 2d
1, 17 (D.D.C. 2004).
57. Each of these statistical methodologies is discussed in detail in Hidden
Priors, supra note 3, at 818-20, 824-28.
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something. Traditional statistical evidence is, strictly
speaking, “relevant” under the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Evidence because it has a “tendency to make a fact
[e.g., the employer discriminated] more or less probable than
it would be without the evidence . . . .”58 Indeed, the central
premise of the Bayesian philosophy of understanding
statistical evidence is that new evidence permits an observer
(or fact-finder) to update prior knowledge, information, or
estimates about a given hypothesis—by definition making
the hypothesis “more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”59
The Nature article drives this point home with a
relatively simple diagram, reproduced for reference in the
Appendix herein. The diagram illustrates the effect of
statistically significant study results on three different
hypotheses, with three different prior likelihoods: the “Long
Shot” hypothesis, with a 5% prior; the “Toss-Up” hypothesis,
with a 50% prior; and the “Good Bet” hypothesis, with a 90%
prior probability.60 The statistical evidence, with p-values of
.01 and .05 respectively, make each of the three hypotheses
more likely than they were before observing the statistical
results.61 In the legal sense, this makes the statistical results
relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401(a).62 Hence,
statistically significant evidence of employment outcome
disparities should be admissible in systemic disparate
treatment cases because it tends to make the hypothesis of
unlawful discrimination more probable than it would have
been in the absence of such evidence. But, importantly, the
statistical results do not make each hypothesis more likely
than not. For some hypotheses—in the Nature example, the
Long Shot hypothesis—the posterior probability remains
well below 50%, even when considering statistical evidence

58. FED. R. EVID. 401(a).
59. See id.; see also Fields, supra note 45, at 1782 (describing Bayesian
updating in the context of the probability of a criminal defendant’s guilt).
60. Nuzzo, supra note 1, at 151.
61. Id.
62. See FED. R. EVID. 401(a).
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with a p-value of .01.63 As illustrated by the Nature examples,
the prior probability (long shot, toss-up, or good bet) plays a
critical role in the determination of the posterior
probability.64 That role has been ignored in systemic
disparate treatment law since its inception.65
Completely prohibiting the use of statistical evidence
would go too far, eliminating an important source of relevant
information in a field of law where direct evidence of
wrongdoing is often unavailable.66 If courts are going to
continue admitting statistical evidence, however, then the
choices essentially boil down to two: (1) continue to ignore the
question of prior probabilities altogether and allow them to
operate sub silentio; or (2) address prior probabilities head
on, using admittedly flawed estimations and crude
approximations.67 The latter is the better choice, despite the
difficulties involved in estimating prior distributions.
Engaging in the effort to make sense of the statistical
evidence that is available—flawed though that effort will
be—ultimately serves the remedial goals of Title VII.
III. PRIORS AND PROCEDURE: THE SECOND-ORDER QUESTIONS
Once courts and scholars recognize that an imperfect, but
transparent, treatment of prior probabilities is preferable to
either: (a) continuing to misapply p-values and statistical
significance tests using traditional statistical analysis with
built-in, unexamined priors; or (b) ignoring statistical
evidence of employment outcome disparities altogether, then
the difficult second-order questions come into focus. This
63. Nuzzo, supra note 1, at 151.
64. See Nuzzo, supra note 1, at 151; Appendix, infra.
65. See Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 821-23; supra Part I.
66. See, e.g., Sean W. Colligan, In Good Measure: Workforce Demographics and
Statistical Proof of Discrimination, 23 LAB. LAW. 59, 59 (2007) (“Courts have long
recognized that plaintiffs in discrimination lawsuits rarely have the benefit of
direct evidence of discrimination. Because overt expressions of discriminatory
motives by managers are rare, indirect evidence of discriminatory intent is often
crucial in employment cases. One commonly used form of indirect evidence of
discrimination . . . is statistical analysis of the employer’s workforce.”) (footnotes
omitted) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989)).
67. See Browne, Statistical Proof, supra note 9, at 488.
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Part considers each of the second-order questions in turn,
and contends that our civil procedure devices are well-suited
to the management of prior probabilities by capitalizing on
institutional strengths.
QUESTION 1: WHOSE PRIORS MATTER?
The first question for prior management is: whose priors
count? Professors Paetzold and Willborn acknowledge this
question, but do not attempt an answer.68 Possible answers
to this question include trial judges, trial fact-finders,
appellate judges, and legislatures. Perhaps the most logical
answer is that it depends on the specific allegations and
evidence, together with the procedural posture of the case.
Indeed, perhaps the division of responsibilities between factfinder, judge, and appellate court regarding priors should be
consistent with that division of labor in all other civil
litigation contexts. Our procedural rules are designed to
permit judges to act as gatekeepers throughout the litigation
process, and to provide standards of appellate review
adjusted to the institutional strengths and weaknesses of
appellate courts.
The specification of prior probabilities might be
effectively managed in the same manner as other similar
questions. The current procedural framework for judicial
gatekeeping in civil litigation, including the dispositive
motions provided under Federal Rules 12(b)(6)69 and 56,70 are
increasingly interpreted to include explicitly probabilistic
components,71 and therefore appear well-suited to the task.
Because the question of whose priors should matter is so
closely intertwined with procedural devices, second-order
Questions 1 and 2 turn out to be related. Both questions will
be considered together in the following Sections, which
68. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 49, § 12.05 n.10 (“An important legal
issue would involve whose prior probabilities should be represented. Because the
Bayesian view of probability is subjective (represents an individual’s
uncertainty), courts would need to decide whose uncertainty the prior distribution
should represent.”).
69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
70. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
71. See infra Part III, Question 2, secs. A–B.
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consider the interplay of procedural gatekeeping devices and
the specification of prior probabilities of discrimination.
QUESTION 2: HOW SHOULD EVALUATION OF PRIORS FIT INTO
CIVIL LITIGATION PRETRIAL PROCEDURE?
A. Motions to Dismiss
1. Plausibility Pleading and Priors. The Court’s recent
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly72 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal73 have renewed interest in probability estimates and
pleading standards. With these cases, the Court tightened
the federal pleading standard by establishing a “plausibility”
test.74 The Court describes the standard as follows: “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”75 The Court prescribed a
two-step analysis.76 First, the court should separate
nonconclusory factual allegations, which must be assumed
true, from alleged legal conclusions, which need not be
assumed true.77 Second, the court should determine whether
the plaintiff’s nonconclusory allegations “plausibly give rise

72. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
73. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). Probabilities likely played some unstated, inchoate
role in the federal pleading regime prior to the Twombly and Iqbal decisions as
well. Even under the prior, more liberal notice pleading rule drawn from the
Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), courts could dismiss
“claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences
in time travel.” See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009); Marc
I. Steinberg & Diego E. Gomez-Cornejo, Blurring the Lines Between Pleading
Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) Plausibility Pleading Standard Converges
with the Heightened Fraud Pleading Standards Under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA,
30 REV. LITIG. 1, 28-29 (2010).
74. Rule 8 provides, in relevant part: “A pleading that states a claim for relief
must contain: . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
75. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
76. Id. at 1950.
77. Id.
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to an entitlement to relief.”78 In making this determination,
the court should draw reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff from the alleged nonconclusory facts,79 but the court
should also consider any “obvious alternative explanation”
for the alleged facts.80 If the facts alleged are “more likely
explained by” the obvious alternative explanation than by
plaintiff’s allegation of a legal violation, then plaintiff’s legal
claim is not plausible and should be dismissed. 81 In making
this determination, courts are instructed to rely on “judicial
experience and common sense.”82
The Court denied that the plausibility standard requires
an assessment of probabilities:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,”
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely
consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”83

Despite this protestation, the plausibility standard
articulated in Iqbal is unquestionably some form of
probability requirement. The line between “mere possibility”
and “plausibility” may not be quantifiable,84 but that line
must exist, and it must be located at some probability greater
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1949 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
80. Id. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
81. Id. at 1951-52.
82. Id. at 1950.
83. Id. at 1949 (citations omitted). The Twombly Court likewise rejected any
suggestion that it was imposing a probability requirement. See Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556 (“Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.”).
84. See, e.g., David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 13435 (2010) (noting that the Court did not explain the “threshold of plausibility” a
complaint must cross, but suggesting that it could be compared to “something like
probable cause to believe the defendant breached a legal duty owed to the
plaintiff.”).
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than 0 and less than 1. This is true even if the plausibility
threshold is allowed to fluctuate based on the type of case or
other factors.85 By comparing the plaintiff’s explanation to
“obvious alternative explanations” and deciding which is
“more likely,” the Court requires a comparative probability
assessment. The phrase “more likely,” is simply another way
of saying “more probably true,” making the analysis a
probability analysis, as others have noted.86
The probabilistic nature of the analysis is revealed by the
competing explanations at issue in Twombly and Iqbal.
Twombly involved allegations of an unlawful conspiracy
among defendants to refrain from competing against each
other in certain designated geographic regions, in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.87 Parallel conduct, even
conscious parallelism, is not itself a violation of Section 1. 88
Section 1 prohibits “only restraints [of trade] effected by a
contract, combination, or conspiracy.”89 The complaint
alleged that defendants engaged in a “parallel course of
conduct,” and that, on information and belief, defendants had
“entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy” to
prevent competition.90 The Court held that the complaint
85. See Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy, Conley as a Special Case of Twombly
and Iqbal: Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and Procedure and the Nature
of Rules, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 36 (2010) (contending that the plausibility
pleading rule could be interpreted as a non-static rule that imposes a burden that
fluctuates according to the particular characteristics of the claims at issue).
86. See, e.g., Allen & Guy, supra note 85, at 36 (“Strikingly, except for the
obviously erroneous assertion that probabilism plays no part in plausibility, the
Court applied the concept of plausibility in a straight forward inference to the
best explanation fashion.”); Rory Bahadur, The Scientific Impossibility of
Plausibility, 90 NEB. L. REV. 435, 456-57 (2011) (“The Court’s use of the term
‘possibility,’ however, belies the assertion that plausibility is not a probability
analysis because possibility is an expression of probability. . . . Plausibility is
therefore achieved when the complaint reaches a threshold level of probability,
but the Court does not define what this threshold level of probability is.”).
Whether or not relative probabilities should be part of the federal pleading
standard is a question that is beyond the scope of this Article.
87. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548.
88. Id. at 553.
89. Id. (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
775 (1984)).
90. Id. at 551.

106

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

failed to state a claim.91 The allegation that defendants
“entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy” was a
conclusory allegation unsupported by nonconclusory facts,
and was not entitled to a presumption of truth.92 The alleged
parallel conduct was “merely consistent” with conspiracy.93 It
was also consistent with an “obvious alternative
explanation”—namely, “the former Government-sanctioned
monopolists [defendants] were sitting tight, expecting their
neighbors to do the same thing.”94 This obvious alternative
explanation was based on the Court’s understanding of how
rational firms would behave in the free market. The Court
had “concluded that [the Twombly complaint] did not
plausibly suggest an illicit accord because it was not only
compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by,
lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior.”95
In Iqbal, the plaintiff brought claims against former
Attorney General John Ashcroft and former FBI director
Robert Mueller, alleging that the defendants violated
plaintiff’s constitutional rights by subjecting plaintiff (a
Pakistani Muslim) “to harsh conditions of confinement on
account of his race, religion, or national origin.”96 Plaintiff
alleged that “under the direction of Defendant [Mueller], [the
FBI] arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men”
during its investigation into the September 11, 2001
attacks.97 Plaintiff alleged that defendants Ashcroft and
Mueller approved a “policy of holding post-September-11th
detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until
they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI . . . .”98 Finally, plaintiff alleged
that defendants “knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject [plaintiff] to harsh conditions of
confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his]
91. Id. at 570.
92. Id. at 564-67.
93. Id. at 557.
94. Id. at 567-68.
95. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
96. Id. at 1942.
97. Id. at 1944.
98. Id.
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religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate
penological interest.”99
The Court found this last allegation to be conclusory, and
therefore not entitled to an assumption of truth.100 The Court
then considered the nonconclusory factual allegations of a
policy of holding detainees in harsh conditions of confinement
until they were cleared by the FBI. The Court noted that
these allegations were “consistent with” plaintiff’s assertion
that defendants “purposefully designat[ed] detainees ‘of high
interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin.”101
But, according to the Court, there was an obvious,
alternative, and “more likely” explanation: “[T]he Nation’s
top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a
devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected
terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the
suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.”102 Given this
more likely explanation, the complaint did not “plausibly
suggest [defendants’] discriminatory state of mind.”103
In both Twombly and Iqbal, the Court drew upon noncase-specific information to inform its analysis of relative
probabilities. In Twombly, the Court relied on microeconomic
theory to determine that innocent parallel conduct was a
more likely explanation for defendants’ behavior than
unlawful conspiracy. In Iqbal, the Court relied on its
assessment of the likely motivations of the nation’s top law
enforcement officers to conclude that a lawful concern for
safety was a more likely explanation for the alleged
treatment than unlawful discrimination. In both cases, the
Court applied its own understanding of background
probabilities, or priors.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 1951 (“These bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy
in Twombly, amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’
of a constitutional discrimination claim . . .”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1952.
103. Id.
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2. Competing Explanations in Systemic Disparate
Treatment Cases. In systemic disparate treatment cases the
probabilistic nature of the analysis is more salient.
Statistics—and therefore probabilities—are the crux of a
systemic disparate treatment case.104 The critical allegations
in a typical systemic disparate treatment complaint will be:
(1) there is an observed, statistically significant disparity in
employment outcomes; and (2) the observed disparity is the
result of unlawful discrimination. The former allegation is a
nonconclusory allegation of fact and is assumed to be true at
the pleading stage. The second allegation appears to be a
conclusion of law under Iqbal, and the court need not accept
it as true.105
A statistically significant disparity could be explained by
unlawful discrimination. But the observed disparity could
also be explained by other obvious alternative explanations.
For example, the statistical disparity could be explained by
the choice of an unrepresentative reference class in a
binomial distribution, or by the omission of a critical
explanatory variable in a regression analysis. Or, the
observed disparity—even if statistically significant—could be
explained by chance. To focus the discussion on the analysis
of priors, I will focus only on two possible explanations for an
observed disparity: (1) unlawful discrimination; and (2)
chance.106 Applying Iqbal, the question for the court is
whether an alleged statistical disparity is more likely
explained by unlawful discrimination or instead more likely
explained by the obvious alternative explanation: chance.
As demonstrated in Hidden Priors and the discussion
above, the answer to this question is a mathematical function
104. See Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, The Hazards of Dukes: The Substantive
Consequences of a Procedural Decision, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 123, 135 (2012).
105. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
106. Another candidate for an “obvious alternative explanation” might be that
the observed statistical disparities are explained by differences in other
independent variables, such as qualifications, education, experience, or levels of
interest in the job. Multiple regression analyses attempt to isolate and control for
the effects of such independent variables. See generally Meier et al., supra note
26, at 7-15. However, even where a multiple regression analysis is used, the
statistician’s choice of independent variables to include in the analysis can be
challenged by the opposing party. See id. at 19.

2015]

P-VALUES, PRIORS, AND PROCEDURE

109

of the prior probability of discrimination and the p-value. In
the simplified example offered in Hidden Priors, an assumed
prior of less than 5% would mean that chance is a more likely
explanation than discrimination for an observed disparity
that has a p-value equal to .05.107 Conversely, an assumed
base rate of more than 5% would mean that unlawful
discrimination is a more likely explanation for that same
observed disparity.108 The choice of prior can be
determinative, even at the motion to dismiss stage.
How should the court determine what prior to use?
Should the district judge use his or her own preconceptions
about the prevalence of discrimination—i.e., “judicial
experience and common sense”?109 Or should the judge
consider that a jury might reasonably arrive at a different
prior? Given the early procedural stage, the judge should
allow for a wide range of potential priors, recognizing that
jurors may hold vastly different notions about the
background rate of discrimination, at least given the limited
empirical evidence available to date.110
To return once again to the simplified example provided
in Hidden Priors, if the district judge believes that a jury
could reasonably assign a prior probability of employment
discrimination higher than 5%, and if the plaintiff alleges in
the complaint an observed statistical disparity that is
107. See Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 822. This example is simplified
in a number of ways, including that it assumes there are no false negatives (or
Type II errors), i.e., the statistical test always catches all true discriminators. See
id. at 821-24. The diagram in the Nature article, in which the Long Shot (5%)
prior is considered in light of p-values of .01 and .05, drew upon a more careful
calibration of p-values for testing precise null hypotheses (e.g., the effect of the
independent variable gender on the dependent variable salary is exactly = 0), and
it also included consideration of the probability of false negatives. See Nuzzo,
supra note 1, at 151 (citing Thomas Sellke et al., Calibration of p Values for
Testing Precise Null Hypotheses, 55 AM. STATISTICIAN 62 (2001)); see also
Appendix, infra.
108. See Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 822-23.
109. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; see also supra text accompanying notes 7177.
110. For a discussion of why deference to the jury may be institutionally
preferable where empirical evidence or academic theory offers little basis for
specifying a prior, see infra Part III, Question 4, sec. E.
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statistically significant at the .05 level (to be later established
by admissible evidence), then the district court should find
the complaint sufficient under the Iqbal plausibility
standard.
The foregoing considers cases where observed statistical
disparity is the only nonconclusory factual allegation
supporting the legal conclusion of discrimination. As part of
the court’s plausibility analysis, however, the court should
also consider other nonconclusory factual allegations. For
example, if plaintiffs allege that every member of the class
was fired by the same rogue store manager who refused to
follow company nondiscrimination policies, then the court
might find unlawful discrimination a more likely explanation
for an observed disparity than chance, even if the court might
have reached the opposite conclusion in the absence of such
nonstatistical allegations.111
3. Beyond Probabilities: Access to Information. The
pleading standard analysis should not be limited to only the
comparative probability analysis described above. Plaintiffs
have not yet had an opportunity to conduct discovery and
obtain access to evidence in defendants’ possession that may
substantiate their claims. The Twombly Court apparently
recognized this information access issue, stating that the
plausibility standard “simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal agreement.”112 This suggests that, along with a relative
probability analysis, trial courts should also consider the
parties’ relative access to evidence pre-discovery.
Neither Twombly nor Iqbal provide further guidance on
how to incorporate the information access problem.113 The
111. This type of plausibility analysis at the motion to dismiss stage appears
consistent with Professor Michael Selmi’s general notion that, as compared to
courts in the late 1970s, courts are now more likely to require plaintiffs to offer
an explanation of the story or narrative that the statistics are telling. See Selmi,
supra note 34, at 481 (arguing that a statistical showing alone is no longer
sufficient to establish a systemic disparate treatment claim, but that it is
incumbent upon plaintiffs to also “explain the story the statistical presentation is
telling . . .”).
112. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
113. The Iqbal Court rejected the argument that tight controls on discovery can
effectively prevent unwarranted discovery from disrupting the work of
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Twombly passage quoted above, however, leaves room for
district judges to assess the parties’ relative access to
information. If the district judge compares the competing
explanations for an observed statistical disparity, taking into
account the wide range of priors that a reasonable jury might
adopt, and concludes that chance is a more likely explanation
for an observed disparity in employment outcomes than the
employer’s unlawful discrimination, then the district court
should next consider whether discovery can be reasonably
expected to change that assessment.114 If so, the court should
deny the motion to dismiss. At the very least, the court
should permit limited, targeted, pleading-stage discovery to
permit a more careful assessment of the relative probabilities
of the competing theories of chance and discrimination.115
B. Summary Judgment
How should the district court consider priors at the
summary judgment stage? At this point, the parties have had
an opportunity to obtain through the discovery process any
information relevant to the probability determination. The
court should therefore focus only on the question of whether
a “justifiable inference[ ]”116 of unlawful discrimination is
warranted by the evidence presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party (typically the
plaintiff in discrimination cases).117

governmental officials. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
559).
114. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE
L.J. 1, 105 n.405 (2010) (noting that more robust EEOC pre-suit investigation
could alleviate problems of relative access to information in discrimination cases).
115. See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 473, 508-14 (2010) (considering ways in which district courts might
permit discovery to proceed during pendency of motion to dismiss); Bahadur,
supra note 86, at 480 n.295.
116. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
117. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58788 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
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The relative probability analysis will be essentially the
same as outlined above, except that it will now be conducted
with the documentary record.118 This evidence must be
“viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.”119 The similarity of the relative probability analysis
for summary judgment purposes to the plausibility pleading
standard is highlighted by comparing Twombly to one in the
trilogy of cases that redefined summary judgment in 1986,
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.120 In
Matsushita, the Court considered an antitrust case quite
similar to Twombly. The plaintiffs were American television
manufacturers who brought claims under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act against Japanese manufacturers, alleging a
price-fixing conspiracy.121 Defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to
establish an illegal conspiracy.122 The Court held that
summary judgment would be appropriate where there was
insufficient evidence to support an inference of a conspiracy,
in light of more likely—more plausible—explanations for the
evidence.123 The Court reasoned: “Respondents in this case, in
other words, must show that the inference of conspiracy is
reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent
action or collusive action that could not have harmed
respondents.”124
For systemic disparate treatment employment
discrimination cases, the analysis would be similar: the court
should consider whether an inference of discrimination is a
118. Federal Rule 56 provides that the record for summary judgment may
consist of “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c)(1)(A).
119. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88 (quoting Diebold, 369 U.S. at 655).
120. 475 U.S. 574.
121. See id. at 577-78.
122. Id. at 578.
123. See id. at 587, 597-98.
124. Id. at 588 (emphasis added); see also Michael J. Kaufman, Summary PreJudgment: The Supreme Court’s Profound, Pervasive, and Problematic
Presumption about Human Behavior, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 593, 600 (2012).
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reasonable explanation for the observed statistical disparity
(now shown through record evidence, rather than just
allegations) in light of the alternative explanation: chance. In
making this determination, the court should again consider
the entire range of prior probabilities that a reasonable jury
could adopt. The relevant prior probabilities will be informed
by the estimated background rate of discrimination in the
relevant labor market, as well as all the nonstatistical
evidence in the record.125
At summary judgment, a court may be more tempted to
substitute its own preconceptions about base rates of
discrimination for the jury’s.126 When priors are not
transparent, the temptation to engage in this type of
substitution is heightened. The majority opinion in WalMart, the Court’s most recent systemic disparate treatment
case, is illustrative.127 Although Wal-Mart actually involved a
motion for class certification, rather than summary
judgment, the Court acknowledged that class certification
decisions must sometimes overlap with inquiries into the
merits.128 As such, class certification motions will involve
similar concerns about courts substituting their priors for
those of a reasonable jury. In Wal-Mart, plaintiffs sought to
certify a nationwide class of female current and former WalMart
employees,
alleging
pay
and
promotion
discrimination.129 The plaintiffs’ central theory was that WalMart’s decentralized promotion policy, which left promotion
decisions largely to the discretion of store managers, resulted
in systematic discrimination companywide against women.130
The majority refused to permit certification of the nationwide
125. See Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 810 n.8.
126. See generally Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 759, 769-73 (2009) (arguing that “judges decid[e] dispositive motions
based on their own views of the facts[,]” despite the supposed requirement that
judges consider “whether a reasonable jury could find” for the nonmovant).
127. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
128. See id. at 2552 (“In this case, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps
with respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or
practice of discrimination.”).
129. See id. at 2547-48.
130. See id.
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class, finding there was not sufficient commonality under
Federal Rule 23.131 In reaching this conclusion, the majority
made an empirically testable (or falsifiable) claim about
background rates of discrimination. The majority reasoned:
“[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that
forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral,
performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that
produce no actionable disparity at all.”132 What the majority
did in this sentence, quite evidently, was to substitute its own
priors on the background rate of promotion discrimination
against women for the range of potential priors that might be
held by a reasonable jury.
The opaqueness of the operation of priors in current
systemic disparate treatment law allowed the majority to
include this empirical claim, without appearing to usurp the
role of the jury. Were systemic disparate treatment law to
undergo a Bayesian revolution, and were prior probabilities
openly acknowledged and managed through the usual civil
procedure devices, then the import of the Wal-Mart
majority’s statement would have been obvious—it
substituted its own priors for that of a reasonable jury.
Whether all reasonable juries would necessarily agree with
the majority’s statement about what “most managers” would
do when making promotion decisions is a separate question,
but it is one that is never even broached under current
systemic disparate treatment doctrine because it is not
recognized as a question about priors.133
Unstated assumptions held by a particular trial judge
about the prevalence (or scarcity) of discrimination could lead
that judge to conclude that proffered statistical evidence is
more (or less) likely to be the result of unlawful
discrimination. This unstated use of the judge’s own prior,
rather than a range of priors that a jury might reasonably
hold, should be guarded against in dispositive pretrial
131. See id. at 2554; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
132. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554; see also Weiss, supra note 44, at 1687
(referring to this statement as the “Wal-Mart presumption”).
133. See generally Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 843-47 (discussing in
further detail the underlying influence of prior probabilities in Wal-Mart).
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motions. Prior probability assessments are necessarily
somewhat subjective and will differ from person to person. A
judge’s priors will be shaped by his or her own experiences,
and will not match those of the individual jury members. For
summary judgment purposes, the court should consider that
range of priors that a reasonable jury could hold, viewing the
nonstatistical evidence in plaintiff’s favor.134
C. Appellate Review
What standard should be used to review prior probability
determinations on appeal? Motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment have been characterized as questions of
law, and appellate review of these procedures has
traditionally been de novo.135 Once the role of specified prior
probabilities in pretrial dispositive motions is recognized,
however, this traditional standard of review might fairly be
questioned. Questions of fact are generally reviewed under a
more deferential standard than questions of law; a trial
court’s factual findings are generally not set aside by an
appellate court unless they are “clearly erroneous.”136 Which
standard should apply to a trial court’s determination of
priors in pretrial dispositive motions? Which court is in a
better position to evaluate the reasonableness of a given
range of priors for purposes of motions to dismiss or motions
for summary judgment?
Iqbal’s importation of “judicial experience and common
sense” into the pleading standard has already raised
questions about whether de novo review remains appropriate
134. Professor Suja Thomas might question whether a judge is even capable of
performing such a metaphysical analysis. See Thomas, supra note 126, at 779
(“[I]t should not be assumed that judges could determine who would sit on a jury
and could consider all viewpoints of those jurors in their decision of whether a
reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.”).
135. On dismissals under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), see, e.g., Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d
988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007); Blackstone Realty LLC v. F.D.I.C., 244 F.3d 193, 197
(1st Cir. 2001); Shepherd v. Sanchez, 27 F. App’x. 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2001). On
summary judgment under Federal Rule 56, see, e.g., McCoy v. Harrison, 341 F.3d
600, 604 (7th Cir. 2003); White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.
2000).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
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for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals: “[District] Judge [Sidney H.]
Stein ‘questioned what the scope of review on appeal of
rulings on such motions will be, observing that he does not
know how closely appeals courts will be regulating the
application of judicial experience and common sense in
reviewing motions to dismiss.’”137
If “judicial experience and common sense” includes a
comparison of relative probabilities in light of the judge’s
assessment of reasonable prior probabilities, then perhaps a
more discretionary standard of review is warranted. Prior
probabilities, which may be thought of as “foundational facts”
(sometimes called “legislative facts”138 or “social facts”139),
occupy an uneasy middle ground between fact and law. They
are, in the scientific sense of the word, “facts,” because they
137. Henry S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal,
Twombly, and the Application of Judicial Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 882
(2012) (quoting the statements of Judge Sidney H. Stein, Southern District of New
York, as recounted in Pamela Atkins, Twombly, Iqbal Introduce More Subjectivity
to Rulings on Dismissal Motions, Judge Says, 78 U.S.L.W. 2667, 2667 (2010)); see
also Edward H. Cooper, King Arthur Confronts TwIqy Pleading, 90 OR. L. REV.
955, 983 (2012) (reviewing Miller’s Double Play article, and noting the question
raised by Professor Miller: “Need the rules be amended to ensure continued de
novo review of dismissals for failure to state a claim?”); Miller, supra note 114, at
35 (“And has the traditional de novo standard used on appellate review of a grant
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion been compromised by the subjective appraisals the Court
has authorized?”).
138. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in
Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2013) [hereinafter
Borgmann, Appellate Review] (considering the question of appellate deference to
trial courts on findings of social fact in constitutional rights cases); Tristin K.
Green, “It’s Not You, It’s Me”: Assessing an Emerging Relationship Between Law
and Social Science, 46 CONN. L. REV. 287, 291 n.8 (2013) (discussing social
framework evidence in discrimination cases as legislative fact); Weiss, supra note
44, at 1715 (applying the classifications of social authority and social fact
described in Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific
Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 880-82 (1988) and John
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488-89 (1986)); see
generally Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942) (distinguishing between
legislative facts and adjudicative facts).
139. See Borgmann, Appellate Review, supra note 138, at 1187 (“The facts
relevant to these kinds of cases are ‘social’ facts, also commonly referred to as
‘legislative’ facts.”).
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are falsifiable.140 They are, at least in the abstract,
empirically testable notions about the state of the world.141
The background rate of discrimination on the basis of race by
all employers in the United States may be practically
unknowable, given our current constraints on data sources
and polling abilities, but theoretically it could be an
empirically measured fact. But these are not case-specific,
adjudicative (or, in Professor Suzanna Sherry’s terminology,
“decisional”) facts.142 They are generalized notions about the
state of the world before taking into account the specific
evidence offered in litigation about the specific defendant
employer before the court.
Given that priors are not easily categorized as fact or law,
what standard of review should apply to priors? This
question closely mirrors the question of the appropriate scope
of appellate review of “social facts” or “legislative facts” in
constitutional cases.143 The question of appellate review of
priors, I posit, should be answered by taking a functional
approach. In deciding the standard of appellate review,
courts should ask the following question: is the district court
in any better position than the reviewing appellate court to
delimit the reasonable range of prior probabilities for the
proposition? In some cases, the appellate courts will be in just
as good a position to delimit the reasonable range of priors.
In others, the trial courts are in a better position, for reasons

140. See Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 145, 150 (2011) (“I rely on the basic scientific definition of facts as (at
least in theory) falsifiable. This is what distinguishes them from values or policy
in the context of judicial decision making.”).
141. See id. at 146.
142. See id.
143. See Borgmann, Appellate Review, supra note 138, at 1187. As an example
of a social fact relevant to a constitutional claim, Professor Borgmann offers:
“[W]hether violent video games cause aggression in children.” See id. at 1187. In
the context of social facts in constitutional cases, Professor Borgmann argues that
appellate courts should review findings of social fact under the same “clearly
erroneous” standard that they apply to questions of adjudicative fact. See id. at
1191, 1247.
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recognized by scholars in other contexts.144 This will often
depend on the source of the prior.
To illustrate, consider the source of the prior in Twombly.
The Supreme Court, reviewing a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), applied its predictions about how rational firms
would act under certain circumstances, drawn from the
Court’s notions of microeconomic theory about rational firm
behavior. The Court did not cite any expert evidence on
microeconomics offered in the case, but nonetheless found
innocent parallel conduct a more likely explanation for the
alleged facts than unlawful conspiracy or combination.145 For
this prior source (an academic understanding of
microeconomic theory, not based on expert testimony),
reviewing courts may be in just as good a position as the
district court to assess the range of reasonable priors. Here,
the reliability of the prior source gained little, if anything,
from the adversarial process. Different judges may take
different views about what a rational firm will do under
various conditions, and the trial judge is in no better position
than the appellate judge to make such a determination.
Where academic theory is the best available source of a prior,
the goal of consistency may counsel in favor of more
searching appellate review.146 This would provide guidance to
lower courts within the appellate court’s binding jurisdiction,
and increase the likelihood of reaching similar results in
similar cases.
But consider an alternative source of priors—expert
testimony from an economist about how rational firms act
under certain conditions. Here, the source of the prior is not
144. See, e.g., id. at 1210-20 (citing efficiency, institutional competence, and the
role of the judiciary as rights protector to argue in favor of a clearly erroneous
standard of review for social fact determinations).
145. See supra Part III, Question 2, sec. A.
146. See generally Borgmann, Appellate Review, supra note 138, at 1244-48
(recognizing the consistency claim, but contending that de novo appellate review
of findings of social fact “presents a cure that is worse than the disease, inviting
unpoliced appellate-level fact-finding for all cases . . . .”); Allison Orr Larsen,
Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 99-101 (2013) (considering efficiency
and institutional competence as reasons for a strong conception of stare decisis on
determinations of generalized questions of fact, but questioning those reasons
because factual precedents may not be the product of careful deliberation).
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just academic theory. In this situation, the fact-finder
observing the testimony may be in a better position to assess
prior probabilities because it can better assess the expert’s
credibility, command of the subject, and responses to crossexamination. In this situation, a more deferential standard
of review, such as abuse of discretion, may be preferable.
Indeed, the Federal Rules seem to contemplate that such
factual determinations will be upheld unless “clearly
erroneous.”147 Professor Borgmann argues that trial courts
are in a better position to make all such “social fact”
determinations, and that appellate courts are susceptible to
making factual determinations based on questionable and
untested sources, such as scientific or empirical claims
advanced in amicus briefs or independent research by
judicial clerks or the judges themselves.148
When specifying or estimating prior probabilities, courts
should take a functional approach. The standard of appellate
review for priors should turn on the pragmatic question of
whether the fact-finder has an institutional advantage over
the appellate court in assessing the prior probabilities, which
will in turn depend on the sources of the prior, discussed
below.
D. Legislation
Finally, specifications of priors for purposes of systemic
disparate treatment cases might be established by the
legislature. Congress could, if there were sufficient empirical
evidence and political support, amend Title VII to indicate a
range of reasonable prior probabilities for systemic

147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court
must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’
credibility.”); see also Borgmann, Appellate Review, supra note 138, at 1199-1202.
148. See Borgmann, Appellate Review, supra note 138, at 1215-20; see also
Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 25-37 (2011) (citing Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) as one example of extra-record fact-finding by appellate
courts, and noting the importance of factual claims in amicus briefs).
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discrimination.149 At present, with a general lack of reliable
empirical studies on the prevalence of employment
discrimination and disagreements about the magnitude of
the problem of unconscious or structural bias in workplaces,
this possibility seems an unlikely scenario. Nonetheless,
advances in the developing social science on discrimination
could make such legislation a possibility in the future.
There is no formal requirement that Congress have
empirical data or engage in legislative fact-finding before
passing legislation.150 However, Professor Wendy Rogovin
outlines a number of informal political checks on Congress
that compel it to engage in fact finding, “rang[ing] from the
self-interested desire for re-election to the civic-minded
concern for serving one’s constituents by ascertaining their
needs and how best to serve them, to the need to use facts to
persuade other lawmakers.”151 Should the legislature make
such a factual determination as a premise to a Title VII
amendment, then trial courts and appellate courts would
generally not be permitted to disregard such legislative
factual determinations.152 Traditionally, the legislature has
been viewed as holding an institutional advantage over

149. Regarding congressional fact-finding, and judicial review thereof, see
generally Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: “The Illusion of Certainty,” 46
HASTINGS. L.J. 1723 (1995). Professor Rogovin distinguishes between political
facts (e.g., “the public wants guns kept away from school yards”) and scientific
facts (e.g., “the extent to which the presence of guns within 1000 feet of a school
yard has a quantifiably significant impact on interstate commerce”). Id. at 1741.
150. See id. at 1741-42.
151. Id. at 1743. Whether courts should defer to such legislative fact-finding is
a separate question, addressed in Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial
Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1 (2009) [hereinafter
Borgmann, Judicial Deference] (arguing that courts should independently review
legislative fact-finding where individual rights are affected by the legislation in
question).
152. See Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding
Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 43 (1988) (“Neither a trial court nor
an appellate court may set aside or disregard legislative determinations of fact
that were the basis for a statute’s enactment, except to the extent that the court
determines that, as a matter of constitutional law, the legislature’s reliance on
those asserted facts cannot withstand scrutiny.”).
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courts in making findings of social fact.153 Whether this
traditional institutional advantage argument holds in every
case is the subject of considerable debate well beyond the
scope of this Article.154 The broader point is that the
legislature might, at some point in the future, be capable of
marshalling sufficient empirical evidence on the prevalence
of
employment
discrimination
to
make
factual
determinations that would be useful for interpreting
traditional statistical evidence of employment outcome
disparities in systemic disparate treatment litigation, and
could amend Title VII accordingly.
QUESTION 3: HOW SHOULD COURTS CONVEY THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIOR PROBABILITIES AND
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF DISPARITY?
A frequent and long-standing challenge to the use of
Bayesian statistical analysis in the courtroom is that it will
be difficult to convey or confusing to the fact-finder.155
153. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of
Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1473 (2010) (“[L]egislatures are
better equipped than the courts to make the sorts of empirical findings relevant
to legislation. Legislatures have more resources than courts to gather
information—they have large staffs, general subpoena power, and large
institutions such as the Congressional Research Service to facilitate their
factfinding—and members of the legislature are more likely to be aware of local
issues than judges because of the electoral process.”); Kate T. Spelman, Revising
Judicial Review of Legislative Findings of Scientific and Medical “Fact”: A
Modified Due Process Approach, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837 (2009)
(providing an overview of the traditional view); Note, Deference to Legislative Fact
Determinations in First Amendment Cases After Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 2312, 2315-16 (1998).
154. For interesting challenges to this traditional view, see Neal Devins,
Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary
Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1206 (2001) (contending that Congressional factfinding deserves deference only under certain conditions in which the legislature
has the proper incentives to be a reliable fact-finder) and Borgmann, Judicial
Deference, supra note 151, at 35-46.
155. See, e.g., Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, The Continuing
Debate Over Mathematics in the Law of Evidence: A Comment on “Trial By
Mathematics,” 84 HARV. L. REV. 1801, 1806 (1971) (recognizing importance of the
confusion point and recommending further, controlled study of the question);
Lempert, supra note 45, at 446 (discussing the confusion critique); Samuel
Lindsey et al., Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 147,
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Incorporating Bayesian statistical reasoning into judicial
proceedings is not a novel concept, and on the question of
fact-finder confusion, employment discrimination scholars
can learn from experiences in other fields of substantive law.
Bayesian interpretations of traditional statistical evidence
have been urged, and, to some extent accepted by, courts in
other legal fields.156 For example, in paternity disputes and
criminal cases involving DNA evidence, experts have
advanced, and some courts have allowed, Bayesian
interpretations of traditional statistical evidence in order to
avoid the transposition fallacy.157 Drawing upon experience
in these other fields, this Question considers possible

155-56, 161 (2003) (finding that expressing statistical results in the form of
natural frequencies can reduce confusion); Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An
Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a
Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS J.
403, 444-45 (2002) (finding that careful use of Bayesian statistical analysis “can
indeed assist the jury in reaching more accurate verdicts, and that it can do so
without manipulating or deceiving the jury.”); Laurence H. Tribe, A Further
Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1814 (1971) (responding
to Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970)); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329
(1971).
156. References to Bayes’s Theorem or the concept of prior probabilities are rare
in reported decisions involving systemic employment discrimination claims. The
following search in the ALLCASES Westlaw database returned only 7 results:
(BAYES! or “PRIOR PROBABILIT!” or “PRIOR ODDS”) & (“SYSTEMIC
DISPARATE TREATMENT” or “DISPARATE IMPACT” or “PATTERN OR
PRACTICE”). None of the results were cases in which courts had rigorously
applied the Bayesian view articulated herein to a systemic disparate treatment
case. By contrast, a significant number of courts have considered the implications
of Bayes’s Theorem and prior probabilities in the context of criminal DNA match
results and paternity testing. The following search in the ALLCASES Westlaw
database returned 114 results: (BAYES! or “PRIOR PROBABILIT!” or “PRIOR
ODDS”) & (“DNA MATCH” or “PATERNITY”). See also DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE
NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, § 14.3.1-14.3.2 (2d ed.
2010); Liebman et al., supra note 4, at 616.
157. See Liebman et al., supra note 4, at 616 (“Nor is it fanciful any longer to
contemplate the routine use of Bayes[’s] Theorem in criminal cases. As we note
above, a combination of DNA and Bayesian analysis presented by experts has
revolutionized proof of paternity, including proof of identity in rape cases
involving minors or severely disabled nursing-home patients who give birth to a
child.”).
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methods for conveying statistical evidence in ways that make
the operation of priors transparent.
A.

Prior Probability Charts

One possibility for incorporating prior probabilities into
systemic disparate treatment litigation is to provide juries
with charts that include a range of prior probabilities, along
with accompanying posterior probabilities reflecting a proper
interpretation of the statistical evidence. Using this method,
juries would be encouraged to estimate for themselves the
prior likelihood that the defendant engaged in
discrimination, based on their assessment of all the
nonstatistical evidence in the case (which will necessarily be
affected by their intuitions about background rates of
employment discrimination). The chart would then indicate
the correct posterior probability estimate using Bayes’s
Theorem to update their prior probability with the new
information learned from the statistical evidence. An
example of such a chart is available in a study performed by
Dale Nance and Scott Morris. The chart used by Nance and
Morris demonstrated the effect of a piece of evidence, having
a likelihood ratio of 25, on a series of prior probabilities
starting from 0% and increasing in 5% increments up to
100%.158
This idea is not new. Professor Kaye describes this
possibility in the context of DNA match evidence in his
evidence treatise, The New Wigmore:
[The] expert might present the jury with a table or graph showing
how the posterior probability changes as a function of the prior
probability. Each juror could consider the other evidence in the case
to arrive at prior odds that are personally satisfactory, then use the
table to determine the posterior odds or probability. 159

A variant on this idea is to present a chart or graph that
demonstrates the relationship between various prior
probabilities and their resulting posterior probabilities as a

158. See Nance & Morris, supra note 155, at 448 app. B.
159. KAYE ET AL., supra note 156, § 14.3.1 (footnotes omitted).
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heuristic device, without encouraging jurors to specifically
select a particular prior probability.160
The introduction of Bayesian concepts into employment
discrimination litigation in this way, including prior and
posterior probability estimates, may seem somewhat farfetched, but the use of Bayes’s Theorem is not new in other
contexts. The presentation of posterior probabilities is
actually common in paternity litigation.161 Unfortunately,
courts frequently (and in most cases erroneously) allow
experts to assume a prior probability of .5.162
Some courts have properly recognized the problem with
a fixed .5 prior assumption, and have required experts to
provide a range of possible prior probabilities, with their
accompanying posterior probabilities. For example, in Plemel
v. Walter, a paternity case, the Supreme Court of Oregon
instructed:
If the expert uses various assumptions [of priors] and makes these
assumptions known, the fact[-]finder’s attention will be directed to
the other evidence in the case, and it will not be misled into
adopting the expert’s assumption as the correct weight to be
assigned to the other evidence. The expert should present
calculations based on assumed prior probabilities of 0, 10, 20, 30,
40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 percent. 163

Plemel demonstrates that courts, in other contexts, have
recognized the limitations of traditional statistical evidence
160. See id.
161. See id. § 12.8.5 n.101 (“The exception is paternity litigation; when genetic
tests are indicative of paternity, testimony as to a posterior ‘probability of
paternity’ is common.”) (citing 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 211, at 922-23
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006)).
162. See id. § 14.3.2.b (discussing paternity cases that invoke the “equally likely
random man assumption” to justify use a prior probability of .5). Sometimes this
.5 prior probability assumption is even left unstated, on the basis that it is a
“neutral” starting point. See id. As Professor Kaye notes, and as some courts have
recognized, the .5 prior probability assumption in a paternity case is not a
“neutral” starting point at all, but rather suggests that the individual before the
court is just as likely to be the father as all the other men in the relevant
population combined. See id. (“For example, if there are 100,000 other men in the
jurisdiction, then all of them combined have a probability of one-half of being the
father.”).
163. Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209, 1219 (Or. 1987).
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and have avoided the transposition fallacy by insisting on the
conveyance of statistical evidence in a way that highlights
the role of prior probabilities.164
B. Prior Probability Decision Thresholds
Other possibilities exist. Rather than providing jurors
with a chart of priors and accompanying posterior
probabilities, an expert might simply describe a threshold
cut-off point estimate for the prior, using as the decision rule
any posterior probability >.5. In other words, a statistical
expert could conceivably use Bayes’s Theorem to work
backwards from the preponderance of the evidence standard
(in mathematical terms, the posterior Prob(A|B) >.5), to
arrive at the prior probability needed, when combined with
the statistical evidence, to cross the burden of persuasion
threshold.165 In the simplified example presented in Part III,
Question 2, Section A.2, a statistical analysis found a p-value
of exactly .05. Using the preponderance of the evidence (>.5)
decision rule, the statistical expert could work backwards
and explain to the jury that if it believed, based on its
assessment of only the nonstatistical evidence in the case
(importantly, including any social framework evidence or
similar evidence bearing on background rates), that the
likelihood of discrimination was some number exceeding 5%,
then the jury should interpret the statistical evidence as the
observance of an outcome disparity sufficient to make it more
likely than not that the employer discriminated. On the other
164. See D.H. Kaye, Plemel as a Primer on Proving Paternity, 24 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 867, 867-69 (1988).
165. Here, the implementation of a Bayesian view of statistical evidence in civil
cases has a distinct advantage over the use of such techniques in criminal cases.
While there is general agreement that the “preponderance of the evidence”
burden of persuasion in a typical civil case can be translated into probability
terms as >.5, the same cannot be said for quantifying the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard in criminal cases. See generally Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in
Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 385, 394 (1985) (noting general agreement regarding the quantification of
the “preponderance of the evidence” standard at >.5, but arguing that a confidence
interval approach is preferable to use of single point estimates); Andrea Roth,
Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1130, 1157 (2010) (describing various concerns with attempts to quantify
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” criminal standard).
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hand, if, considering all the nonstatistical evidence, the jury
believed that the likelihood of discrimination was exactly 5%
or less, then the jury should interpret that statistical
evidence as insufficient to conclude that it is more likely than
not that the employer discriminated.
C. Likelihood Ratios
An alternative presentation of probabilities that can help
avoid the transposition fallacy is a simple presentation of the
likelihood ratio, rather than a presentation of p-values. The
likelihood ratio is an expression of the relationship between
the likelihood of seeing particular evidence (here, the
statistical disparity observed in employment outcomes) in
the case of discrimination, as compared to the likelihood of
seeing that same evidence in the case where the defendant
did not discriminate.
In the criminal context, Norman Fenton and Martin Neil
described the likelihood ratio as follows:
For any piece of evidence E, the likelihood ratio of E is the
probability of seeing that evidence if the defendant is guilty divided
by the probability of seeing that evidence if the defendant is not
guilty. It follows directly from Bayes Theorem that if the likelihood
ratio is bigger than 1 then the evidence increases the probability of
guilt (with higher values leading to higher probability of guilt)
while if it is less than 1 it decreases the probability of guilt (and the
closer it gets to zero the lower the probability of guilt).166

To relate this to the systemic discrimination context, a
statistical expert could present the statistical evidence of
employment outcome disparities in the form of a likelihood
ratio. If the employment outcome disparity is such that we
would be equally as likely to observe the disparity if the
employer had been discriminating as if the employer had not
been discriminating, then the likelihood ratio would equal 1.
This would mean that the statistical evidence offered no real
value in helping to decide whether the employer unlawfully
discriminated.167 On the other hand, if the probability of
observing a given disparity if the employer had hired at
166. Fenton & Neil, Probabilistic Reasoning, supra note 45, at 9.
167. See id. (“If the likelihood ratio is equal to or close to 1 then E offers no real
value at all since it neither increases nor decreases the probability of guilt.”).
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random were 1000 to 1, and the probability of observing that
same disparity if the employer had discriminated were 1,
then we would know that the statistical evidence has made it
1000 times more likely that the employer was a discriminator
than it had been before considering the statistical evidence.168
And, importantly, this would be true regardless of the prior
selected by a jury or judge, and yet it still manages to convey
the statistical information in a way that prevents
misinterpretation of p-values.169
Fenton and Neil cite a specific example of likelihood
ratios being used to avoid the transposition fallacy in a
criminal case, R. v. Barry George.170 There, the defendant had
been convicted of murdering TV presenter Jill Dando, based
in part on forensic gunpowder evidence.171 At the original
trial, the only probability evidence offered was the
probability of finding the evidence, given an assumption that
the defendant was not guilty (.01).172 On appeal in Barry
George, expert statistical testimony was offered, showing
that the likelihood ratio of the gunpowder evidence was
approximately equal to 1. That is, the likelihood of observing
the gunpowder evidence assuming the defendant’s guilt was
also equal to .01.173 The gunpowder evidence actually offered
no real probative value.
Fenton and Neil note a concern about the use of
likelihood ratios—they tend to be confusing to lawyers,
judges, and jurors for the same reason that a full explication
168. See id. (using a similar example in the criminal context).
169. See id. at 9-10 (“Another advantage of using the likelihood ratio is that it
removes one of the most commonly cited objections to Bayes Theorem, namely the
obligation to consider a prior probability for a hypothesis like ‘guilty’ . . . .”).
170. See id. at 9 (citing R. v. George, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 2722, [1] (Eng.)).
171. See id.; see also George Not Guilty of Dando Murder, BBC NEWS (Aug. 1,
2008, 10:47 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7536815.stm.
172. R. v. Barry George, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 2722, [23], [44] (Eng.). This
probability evidence is analogous to the p-value evidence offered in systemic
discrimination cases: the probability of observing a statistical disparity as large
as was observed, given an assumption of hiring at random.
173. See Fenton & Neil, Probabilistic Reasoning, supra note 45, at 9 (“This is
because both P(E | Guilty) and P(E | not Guilty) were approximately equal to
0.01.”).
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of the mathematical formula underpinning Bayes Theorem
tends to be confusing.174 While likelihood ratios hold promise,
due to their ability to avoid the express selection of a prior
distribution, they may be difficult for judges and juries to
digest.175
D. Visual Representations
In some circumstances, visual representations of
frequencies may work better than charts or likelihood ratios
to convey the probative value of statistical evidence in a way
that avoids the transposition fallacy. Fenton and Neil explain
that even “highly intelligent barristers, judges and surgeons”
have a tendency to “simply switch-off at the sight of a
formula,” making it impossible for them to follow
explanations of Bayes Theorem or likelihood ratios.176 Fenton
and Neil argue that the underlying formulaic workings of
Bayes’s Theorem, or the “first principles” of Bayesian
reasoning, need not be presented to juries.177 Rather, Fenton
and Neil propose showing jurors visual explanations or event
trees that illustrate frequencies. They offer a relatively
simple event tree that illustrates the application of Bayes’s
Theorem in a DNA matching case.178 A similar event tree
could be constructed for the classic Harvard Medical School
example, set out in the Introduction of this Article. That
example is presented below as Diagram A.

174. See id. at 10.
175. Others have similarly questioned whether jurors can understand
likelihood ratios. See Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of
DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 859, 877 (1996) (“Even when likelihood ratios are properly conveyed, there
is little reason to believe that jurors will understand what they mean and how
they should be used. Although they have scientific merit, likelihood ratios–which
are the ratios of conditional probabilities–are not easy to understand.”).
176. Fenton & Neil, Probabilistic Reasoning, supra note 45, at 11.
177. See id. at 13-14.
178. See id. at 6 fig. 2. Fenton and Neil also construct more elaborate visual
representations attempting to show three-dimensional depth, as well as visual
representations that permit multi-step Bayesian updating. See id.
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1: Positive Test
(True Positives)
1: has disease
0: Negative Test
Population:
1000
999: no disease

~ 50: Positive Test
(False Positives)

~ 949: Negative
Test

Diagram A

For every 1 true positive test, there are approximately 50
false positive tests. For any randomly selected individual
that tests positive, the probability that the individual
actually has the disease is approximately 2%.179
As is readily apparent from Diagram A, the use of visual
representations of natural frequencies may be useful in
helping even judges and juries with little mathematical
aptitude avoid the transposition fallacy.180 A similar visual
representation of statistical evidence could be prepared by
statistical experts in systemic employment discrimination
cases. Such visual representations could avoid the
misinterpretation of p-values, and could assist the court and
the fact-finder in understanding the probative value of
statistical evidence of employment outcome disparities.
Of course, in the Harvard Medical School study the prior
is assumed, and can be quantified, as 1 in 1000.181 In the
employment discrimination context, the prior is obviously not
179. Based on the research question presented to subjects in Casscells et al.,
supra note 4, at 999-1000.
180. This is generally consistent with the findings of Lindsey et al., supra note
155, at 156, regarding the presentation of natural frequencies to avoid juror
confusion.
181. See Casscells et al., supra note 4, at 999.
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known. But this does not undermine the usefulness of visual
representations of frequencies. As Fenton and Neil point out,
the jury can be presented with a variety of assumptions
regarding the prior probabilities, where there is genuine and
acknowledged uncertainty, and experts can run a variety of
such visual models for various assumptions.182 Fenton and
Neil liken this approach to an electronic calculator
performing long division for the jurors, without the jurors
necessarily needing to understand all of the inner processes
of the calculator.183
QUESTION 4: WHAT ARE LEGITIMATE SOURCES OF PRIORS?
Where should priors come from? Priors are necessarily
subjective, at least to some degree. But not all priors are
created equally. In the Bayesian view, prior beliefs are
revised over time as more information is added to the
decision-maker’s base of knowledge. In this sense, some
priors may be more well-informed or more “objective”184 than
others. This Question briefly examines some possible sources
of priors. The point is not to develop a definitive ordinal
ranking of sources in terms of objectiveness, but rather to
show that exposing the existence of priors will allow judges,
reviewing courts, and the public to examine the
reasonableness of priors. Making prior sources transparent
will allow for more effective structural and political checks on
fact-finders and courts.

182. See Fenton & Neil, Probabilistic Reasoning, supra note 45, at 20-21
(explaining that Bayesian visual models can be run with different sets of
assumptions, and that the jury would decide whether the assumptions were
reasonable).
183. Id. at 13.
184. A subset of Bayesian statistical thinking, known as “objective Bayesian
analysis” emphasizes the selection of prior distributions by using available
objective, empirical data. See generally James Berger, The Case for Objective
Bayesian Analysis, 1 BAYESIAN ANALYSIS 385 (2006) (addressing the debate as to
the value of objective versus subjective Bayesian analysis).
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A. Judicial Notice
One source of priors is information from which a court
would be permitted to take judicial notice of the fact’s
existence. Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides a
workable definition of when priors could be adopted by
judicial notice. Under Rule 201(b), a court “may judicially
notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because
it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.”185
Scenarios involving judicial notice of a prior might
include the extreme examples, offered by Justice Souter in
his Iqbal dissent, of “little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent
trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.”186 In those cases,
the range of reasonable prior probabilities might include only
0, or some number approaching 0.187 At present, in the
discrimination context, reasonable people can hold vastly
different preconceptions about the prior likelihood of
discrimination,188 making judicial notice generally improper
as a source of prior probabilities for systemic disparate
treatment cases.
B. Empirical Evidence
Another potential source for developing a prior is
empirical evidence. For example, in the employment
discrimination context, the court or fact-finder could consider
any non-case-specific empirical studies that have attempted
to discern the base rate of employment discrimination.
Elsewhere, I have discussed some potential empirical studies
that could shed light on base rates of employment

185. FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
186. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009).
187. For potential shortcomings of the Federal Rule of Evidence’s description of
what may be judicially noticed, see Christopher Onstott, Judicial Notice and the
Law’s “Scientific” Search for Truth, 40 AKRON L. REV. 465, 483-87 (2007).
188. See Weiss, supra note 44, at 1691.
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discrimination.189 These might include studies of litigant
success in employment discrimination litigation.190
For some priors, empirical studies may provide a robust
and relatively reliable source of information about the
reasonable range of potential prior probabilities. Robust
empirical data would perhaps represent the ideal source of
priors for objective Bayesian analysis. For other questions,
the nature of the proposition at issue may mean that
empirical studies are rare, deeply flawed, or non-existent—
at least given currently available methodologies and
technology. In these cases, available empirical studies are
likely to be of limited or questionable value in setting a range
of reasonable priors.
C. Expert Testimony (Including Contextualist Evidence)
Another source of information for setting priors would be
expert testimony. This could include an expert’s report on
empirical research into the proposition directly at issue,
which would place it in the preceding category. Alternatively,
this could involve expert testimony about more generalized,
non-case-specific social science evidence that can help
describe the context in which the prior probability range
should be assessed.
This type of expert testimony would not attempt to
directly pinpoint an estimated base rate, but instead would
attempt to “adjust” otherwise erroneous or likely mistaken
prior preconceptions by identifying specific and systematic
failings in our ability to accurately assess priors. One
example is the type of social framework evidence that has
been offered in systemic employment discrimination cases.
Social framework evidence may include “general social
science research [that] can provide a valuable context for
189. See Bent, Telltale Sign, supra note 52, at 834-36 (suggesting the courts
could consider empirical studies of employment discrimination litigation,
including Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103
(2009) and Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429
(2004)).
190. See supra note 181.
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deciding case-specific factual issues.”191 The purpose of social
framework evidence is to “help[ ] educate fact-finders about
the conditions under which gender stereotypes and prejudice
are likely to influence impressions, evaluations, and behavior
in social and organizational settings.”192
In Wal-Mart, Dr. William Bielby, a sociologist, testified
that “social science research demonstrates that gender
stereotypes are especially likely to influence personnel
decisions when they are based on subjective factors, because
substantial decision-maker discretion tends to allow people
to seek out and retain stereotyping-confirming information
and ignore or minimize information that defies
stereotypes.”193 Dr. Bielby also went one (controversial) step
further, and compared the actual practices at Wal-Mart to
this general social science backdrop, concluding that WalMart’s “personnel policies and practices make pay and
promotion decisions vulnerable to gender bias.”194
The Court’s opinion in Wal-Mart disregarded Dr. Bielby’s
testimony, stating: “Bielby’s testimony does nothing to
advance respondents’ case.”195 The Court reached this
conclusion because of Dr. Bielby’s inability to make casespecific conclusions. The Court noted that “Dr. Bielby
conceded that he could not calculate whether 0.5 percent or
95 percent of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart might
be determined by stereotyped thinking.”196 Because Dr.
Bielby had no answer to this “essential question,” the Court
dismissed his testimony as “worlds away from ‘significant
191. John Monahan et al., The Limits of Social Framework Evidence, 8 L.
PROBABILITY & RISK 307, 308 (2009) [hereinafter Monahan et al., The Limits].
192. Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37,
53 (2009) (quoting Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Social Framework Analysis
as Expert Testimony in Sexual Harassment Suits, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 51ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE
ON LABOR 575, 579 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1999)).
193. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 601 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
194. See id.
195. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
196. Id. at 2553.
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proof’ that Wal-Mart ‘operated under a general policy of
discrimination.’”197
But the Court’s analysis of Dr. Bielby’s expert testimony
overlooked the importance of prior probabilities and thereby
misconceived the role of social framework testimony. Priors
are crucial in interpreting statistical evidence of disparity,
and a social framework expert’s non-case-specific testimony
can inform or adjust a prior probability. Scholars critical of
Dr. Bielby’s testimony in Wal-Mart object to his attempt to
link general social science research to specific practices or
procedures at Wal-Mart stores, without following a scientific
methodology.198 They are not generally opposed to the
introduction and consideration of general social science
evidence of background rates of discrimination or the
circumstances under which stereotyping or discrimination is
more or less likely to occur.199 Acknowledgement of prior
probabilities brings the proper role of social framework
evidence into clear focus: it can help courts or fact-finders
identify ranges of reasonable priors, or help them adjust
misconceived,
unsupported
assumptions
of
prior
probabilities. A social framework expert need not link
background social science findings to case-specific
information. Contextual information is still valuable because
it can help set or adjust the range of reasonable priors.
D. Academic Theory
Another prior source is academic theory, as illustrated in
Twombly. There, the Court predicted rational firm behavior
197. Id. at 2554.
198. See Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 445 n.205 (2011); John Monahan et al.,
Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social
Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1743 (2008) [hereinafter Monahan et al.,
Contextual Evidence]; compare Monahan et al., The Limits, supra note 191
(arguing that “general research findings cannot be linked by an expert witness to
the facts of a specific case.”), with Hart & Secunda, supra note 192 (arguing that
experts should be permitted to “link[ ] a field of knowledge to the case facts” at
least in some circumstances).
199. See Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence, supra note 198, at 1743;
Monahan et al., The Limits, supra note 191, at 308, 319.
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based on its understanding of microeconomic theory. The
Twombly Court “concluded that [the complaint] did not
plausibly suggest an illicit accord because it was not only
compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by,
lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior.”200 The
Twombly Court did not cite any empirical or expert evidence
to substantiate this claim, but rather relied on economic
theory to predict expected wealth-maximizing behavior.201
A similar assumption based on economic theory was
central to the summary judgment decision in Matsushita. As
Professor Michael Kaufman describes Matsushita:
In reaching its result, the Supreme Court presumed that
businesses naturally engage in rational wealth-maximizing
behavior. The Court next concluded that no rational wealthmaximizing institution would enter into a long-term agreement to
set below-cost pricing because no institution would expect to
recover substantial short-term losses with uncertain long-term
gains or would trust their coconspirators to maintain their
agreement.202

In Matsushita, the Court cited to a textbook as the basis
for the theory predicting rational behavior: Robert Bork’s The
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself.203 Whether
stated or unstated, both cases involved an underlying
assumption about how the world works, based on
microeconomic theory and “a strong presumption that

200. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)).
201. The Court did cite an Antitrust Law text for the proposition that conscious,
interdependent parallelism does not establish an unlawful conspiracy in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553-54 (citing 6 P.
Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1433a, at 236 (2d ed. 2003)). In
dissent, Justice Stevens challenged the majority’s implicit assumption by quoting
Adam Smith. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 591 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in
39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 55 (Robert Maynard Hutchins &
Mortimer J. Adler eds., 1952)); see also Kaufman, supra note 124, at 603 n.47.
202. Kaufman, supra note 124, at 598-99.
203. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)
(citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
144 (1978)).
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persons and businesses make purely rational choices with a
singular intent to maximize their wealth.”204
Whether the theoretical prediction of rational, wealthmaximizing behavior is consistent with what individuals and
firms actually do in the real world is a question that could in
theory be empirically tested. Firms either do or do not act
according to this theoretical prediction. Recent critiques from
the field of psychology cast serious doubt on whether
individuals and firms act rationally. Developments in
psychology, and the related field of behavioral economics, for
example, call into question assumptions about purely
rational, wealth-maximizing behavior.205
The point is not to debate the merits of classical economic
assumptions versus behavioral economics. The point is that
courts sometimes, as in Matsushita and Twombly, rely on
prior assumptions rooted in academic theory.206 If prior
probabilities
were
made
transparent,
such
predeterminations could be subjected to critique, evaluation,
and challenge by litigants, by reviewing courts, and by the
public.
E. Otherwise Unsupported Estimates
The last category of prior source needs little explanation.
Prior probabilities could simply be unsupported guesses,
estimates, or assertions about the state of the world, based
on idiosyncratic beliefs held by judges or fact-finders, and not
based on any evidence in the record. An arguable example is
Justice Scalia’s prediction in Wal-Mart about how “most
managers in any corporation” would make promotion
decisions:
[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and
surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex
discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based
criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable
disparity at all. Others may choose to reward various attributes
204. Kaufman, supra note 124, at 595.
205. See id. at 611-20 (detailing critiques based in “neuroscience, psychology,
behavioral economics, and hedonics”).
206. See supra Part III, Question 3, secs. A–B.
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that produce disparate impact—such as scores on general aptitude
tests or educational achievements . . . . And still other managers
may be guilty of intentional discrimination that produces a sexbased disparity. In such a company, demonstrating the invalidity
of one manager’s use of discretion will do nothing to demonstrate
the invalidity of another’s.207

Justice Scalia cited no empirical support, no expert
testimony or report, no academic theory, nor any other
evidence inside or outside of the record on appeal to support
this assertion.208 Yet, this statement earned the votes of five
Supreme Court justices.209 It could be that the majority
believed this assertion to be true because it is believed to be
consistent with purely rational, wealth-maximizing behavior
by managers. But the majority did not identify economic
theory as the source for this presumption.210
A similarly unsupported prior appeared to be at work in
Iqbal, where the Court assumed, without citing a source, that
defendants’ desire to “keep suspected terrorists in the most
secure conditions available until the suspects could be
cleared of terrorist activity” was a more likely explanation for
the observed events than unlawful discrimination.211 Again,
this represents a statement of fact—a statement about which
of two factual conditions is more likely than the other.
To the extent that priors are based on unsupported
estimates, guesses, or hunches, this is probably a task best
left to juries rather than to trial judges, appellate judges, or
even Supreme Court justices. Juries, unlike judges, are
selected more or less randomly from the general
population.212 This gives them an institutional advantage
over judges in estimating questions about the prevalence of
discrimination in America’s workplaces. Empirical evidence
207. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011); see also Weiss,
supra note 44, at 1687.
208. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
209. See id. at 2546.
210. See id.
211. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
212. See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury:
Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 479 (1997).
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has shown that, in discrimination cases, the minority status
of the presiding judge is related to the likelihood of the
claim’s success.213 There is similar evidence that a judge’s
gender matters for outcomes in sexual harassment cases.214
And there is little diversity currently on the federal bench.215
Juries, on the other hand, are composed of more than a single
individual, and therefore tend to bring a wider diversity of
backgrounds. While any individual juror may be biased in the
same way an individual judge might be, the jury as a group
has the benefit of deliberation.216 Moreover, the decisions of a
diverse jury can bring increased public confidence in
outcomes.217 The institutional advantages and added
213. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1121,
1156 (2009); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The Realism of Race in Judicial
Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis of Plaintiffs’ Race and Judges’ Race, 28
HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 91, 94, 103 (2012); Jill D. Weinberg & Laura
Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial
Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 349 (2012); see also Thomas B. Colby, In
Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944, 2001-05 (2012) (noting that
diversity on the bench can help judges overcome “empathic blind spots”).
214. See SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY
REALLY MATTER 28 (2013); Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effect
of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 401 (2010); Pat K. Chew, Judges’
Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases: Emerging Evidence-Based
Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 359, 366 (2011).
215. See Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 213, at 347-48 (“According to the
Federal Judicial Center, diversity within the federal judiciary is minimal. Only
136 of the 597 active federal district judges are a member of a racial/ethnic
minority, roughly 22.8 percent. This figure is slightly larger for female judges;
174 federal district court judges are women—roughly 29 percent.”).
216. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges are Gatekeepers: Democracy,
Morality, Status, and Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help from Ordinary Citizens),
80 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1996) (noting the advantage of deliberation, but
recognizing that such advantage may be limited, in light of empirical studies
showing that jurors reach initial decisions before deliberation); Joshua
Wilkenfeld, Newly Compelling: Reexamining Judicial Construction of Juries in
the Aftermath of Grutter v. Bollinger, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2311 (2004) (“Yet
another set of improvements in functionality arises in juries from an improved
climate for communication. Social science research has established that diverse
groups may be more likely to communicate effectively and creatively.”).
217. See generally Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure?
A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
707, 767 (1993) (considering racial diversity in criminal cases); Wilkenfeld, supra
note 216, at 2314 (“Communities view demographically balanced juries as more

2015]

P-VALUES, PRIORS, AND PROCEDURE

139

legitimacy of juries suggests that, where guesses or estimates
without empirical or academic support serve as the basis for
priors, juries should be doing the guessing—not Supreme
Court justices.
IV. A BAYESIAN REVOLUTION FOR ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW?
Hidden Priors makes the case that Bayesian analysis
should be adopted for systemic disparate treatment law,218
and the foregoing makes the case that Bayesian analysis,
including the estimation of prior probabilities, can be
successfully implemented in systemic disparate treatment
cases.219 A further question is whether this Bayesian
revolution should be limited to only systemic disparate
treatment law, or whether it should instead apply to all
employment discrimination theories. In The Impossibility of
Agnostic Discrimination Law, Deborah Weiss argues that all
of employment discrimination law is necessarily influenced
by prior preconceptions about background rates of
discrimination,220 and therefore an expressly Bayesian
approach should be adopted in all discrimination doctrine,
including in the formulation of evidentiary devices used in
individual disparate treatment cases.221
A form of Bayesian reasoning probably underlies most
rational decision-making under uncertainty, regardless of
the decision-maker. Judge Richard Posner, in his book How
Judges Think, eloquently put the point this way: “Bayesian
theory is a way of systematizing the elementary point that
preconceptions play a role in rational thought.”222 Jurors
unquestionably take their views of the world with them into
any deliberations. But this observation does not necessarily
mean that juries in all discrimination cases, including in
legitimate than those that are unreflective. The presence of balanced juries, then,
engenders greater respect for the justice system and its verdicts.”).
218. See Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 810-11.
219. See supra Parts I-III.
220. See Weiss, supra note 44, at 1679, 1694-96 (explaining the role of
background rates of discrimination in the evaluation of nonstatistical, informal
evidence typically used in individual disparate treatment cases).
221. See id. at 1694-96, 1731-32, 1742.
222. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 67 (2008).
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individual disparate treatment cases, should have Bayes’s
Theorem presented to them so that they can mathematically
understand how to value their priors. Nor does it mean that
appellate courts should, in the absence of reliable empirical
evidence on background rates of discrimination, establish
evidentiary devices based on the Supreme Court’s (or the
Circuit Court of Appeals’) best guesses about background
rates of discrimination. Rather, where unsupported guesses
or other weak evidence on background rates are the best
available evidence, juries should be allowed to reach
inconsistent outcomes attributable to disparate, yet
reasonable, estimates of priors.223 Bayes’s Theorem should be
used sparingly, and only when necessary to guard against the
misuse of traditional statistical evidence. Jurors intuitively
factor in their own priors in a nonmathematical fashion when
viewing evidence in individual cases,224 and attorneys often
have the opportunity to strike jurors who seem too tightly
tethered to their priors.225 No introduction of mathematical
formulas or visual representations of Bayes’s Theorem is
necessary in these individual cases.226

223. Although I am in general agreement with Professor Weiss that background
assumptions about discrimination do influence individual discrimination cases
just as they do systemic cases, I part ways with her on the need for additional
evidentiary devices prescribed by appellate courts to combat inconsistency in
outcomes at the trial level. See Weiss, supra note 44, at 1742 (urging the Supreme
Court to develop evidentiary devices based on social framework evidence, because
decisions made by triers of fact in the absence of such evidentiary devices are
“hopelessly inconsistent”).
224. See id. at 1679 (“[T]o the extent that a finding of discrimination is left to
the trier of fact, background assumptions are merely an unstated factor
determining the trier’s conclusions.”).
225. See generally Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People
with Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1183-84 (2003) (summarizing voir dire procedures in
state and federal courts).
226. Professor Weiss appears to agree that the open litigation of background
rates of discrimination in every individual disparate treatment case may not be
appropriate, as that would “turn each and every discrimination trial into a forum
for examining the pattern of discrimination in the United States today.” Weiss,
supra note 44, at 1679. Instead, she argues for reinvigorating the use of
evidentiary devices set by appellate courts in individual disparate treatment
discrimination cases, and basing those evidentiary devices on background rates
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The problem starts with the first mention of p-values or
statistical significance in a systemic case. Once traditional
hypothesis testing statistics are offered into evidence, or are
presented to the judge in connection with dispositive pretrial
motions, the possibility for misuse and misunderstanding
appear.227 At this point, the transposition fallacy predicted in
the Nature article becomes a very real risk.228 When even
scientists and doctors cannot necessarily be trusted to
properly interpret p-values, judges and jurors have little
chance. At this point, a Bayesian presentation—whether in
the form of prior probability charts, a Bayesian decision
threshold, a likelihood ratio, or a visual representation—
becomes necessary to avoid the transposition fallacy. Thus,
the Bayesian revolution that I advocate is a limited one. It
calls for a Bayesian analysis only when statistical evidence
of employment outcome disparities are offered to establish
disparate treatment employment discrimination.229
There is much more for attorneys, scholars, and courts to
do to before this Bayesian revolution in systemic disparate
treatment law can become a reality. Scholars must continue
to devote attention to the vexing second-order questions
discussed above. This Article presented only one view on
these questions, and nobody has yet advanced a fully
satisfactory answer to the persistent challenge of devising
that are determined by reference to social framework evidence. See id. at 173132.
227. See supra Introduction; see also Bent, Hidden Priors, supra note 3, at 82023.
228. See Nuzzo, supra note 1, at 151-52; supra note 9 and accompanying text.
229. This may extend to certain, limited individual disparate treatment cases
where statistical evidence is admissible to establish an individual case. There is
currently a split of authority on the question whether individual disparate
treatment plaintiffs may rely on statistical evidence of disparities to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. See Bent, Telltale Sign, supra note 52, at 81214 (discussing circuit split on this question and citing cases). Even where
statistical evidence cannot be used to establish an individual’s prima facie case of
discrimination, a number of courts nonetheless permit the use of statistical
evidence to help prove the pretext portion of an individual disparate treatment
claim. See id. at 813 (citing Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d
1223, 1227 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006), Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 2000),
and Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated
on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999)).
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the best method for specification of prior probabilities. Courts
must be open to considering Bayesian arguments in
discrimination cases, as some have been in the paternity
testing and DNA matching contexts.230
Finally, attorneys must be willing to offer a Bayesian
view of employment statistics in a systemic discrimination
case. To my knowledge, this has not yet happened, despite
numerous opportunities, including the several regional class
actions against Wal-Mart that were filed following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart.231 Why it has not
happened remains a bit of a mystery, ripe for further
exploration by scholars. One possibility is that both plaintiffs
and defendants are satisfied with the predictable battle of
experts that occurs in systemic discrimination cases
involving traditional hypothesis testing statistics. A common
scenario involves the plaintiffs defining the relevant
population for study quite broadly, increasing the overall
sample size, and thereby making a finding of statistical
230. See supra Part III, Question 3, secs. A–D.
231. See Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint ¶¶ 58-60, 70, Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252-CRB);
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Wal-Mart’s Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amended
Complaint at 3, 20-22, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (No. C-01-2252-CRB); Declaration of Dr. Richard Drogin in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification ¶ 74, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222
F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252-CRB) (describing regression analyses
performed at various levels and reporting the conclusion: “The shortfall in female
earnings, pay rates, and promotion rates have a high degree of statistical
significance.”); Declaration of Marc Bendick Jr., Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs’
Motion for Class Certification ¶ 43, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D.
137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252-CRB) (describing “statistically significant”
results from a standard deviation analysis); Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 48, 58-59,
Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (No. 3:1201009), on appeal on other grounds, No. 13-6194 (6th Cir. 2013); Plaintiffs’
Opposition to Wal-Mart’s Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint at 21,
Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (No. 3:1201009), on appeal on other grounds, No. 13-6194 (6th Cir. 2013) (describing
plaintiffs’ “refined” statistical analysis); Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Jury
Demand ¶¶ 39-41, Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-02954-O, 2012 WL
5292957 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2012); Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 56, 66-68, Love v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 0:12-cv-61959-RNS, 2013 WL 5434565 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
23, 2013); Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 61-63, Ladik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 291
F.R.D. 263 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-00123-bbc).
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significance more likely.232 The defendant’s expert typically
responds by arguing that the plaintiffs’ selected reference
population is too broad. The defense expert then runs
traditional statistical tests on a smaller population, often
resulting in finding that the observed disparities are not
statistically significant. This scenario played out in WalMart, where the plaintiffs’ expert argued that the relevant
population for study was either the nationwide population of
Wal-Mart employees or region-by-region populations
(making the observed disparities statistically significant),233
while the defense argued that separate statistical analyses
should be performed for each store or even for each
department within stores (which led to findings that the
observed disparities were not statistically significant).234 The
parties to systemic discrimination cases are by now familiar
with this dance, and its predictability may be valued by both
232. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 49, § 4.29-4.36; William T. Bielby &
Pamela Coukos, “Statistical Dueling” with Unconventional Weapons: What Courts
Should Know About Experts in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 56
EMORY L.J. 1563, 1597-98 (2007) (“[M]ost importantly, power increases with
sample size. A gender gap of a specific magnitude (say 15%) is more likely to show
up as statistically significant in a regression analysis based on 1,000 observations
than in one based on 100 observations.”); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 120-21 (2003) (“Statistical significance
becomes harder to attain as the sample size shrinks.”); Paetzold, supra note 43,
at 402 (“Third, p-values are highly influenced by sample size (here, the actual
number of hiring decisions included), so that simply by increasing the sample size
and holding other things constant, a statistician can eventually achieve statistical
significance.”); Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass:
Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 HOUS. L.
REV. 1517, 1527 n.50, 1540 (1995); see also Weiss, supra note 44, at 1710-13
(considering the reference class problem).
233. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011) (discussing
statistical evidence of regression analyses performed at national and regional
levels).
234. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 156-57 (N.D. Cal.
2004), aff’d in part, remanded in part by 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131
S. Ct. 2541 (“Defendant argues that because Dr. Drogin’s regression analysis was
conducted at the regional, rather than the store (or store department) level, his
results are too generalized and fail to account for the significant differences in
compensation practices that exist among the individual stores. In statistical
language, Dr. Drogin’s regional analyses suffer from ‘aggregation bias,’ and the
only way to cure this bias, according to Defendant, would be to ‘disaggregate’ the
data and test it at the store-by-store level.”).
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sides.
Nevertheless,
a
creative attorney—whether
representing employees or employers—may soon decide to
venture into the untested waters of Bayesian analysis in
discrimination cases. Until that happens, scholars can only
continue to make the case that stubborn adherence to pvalues, without acknowledgment of prior probabilities, is
misguided and that a Bayesian revolution is both preferable
and manageable.
CONCLUSION
Systemic disparate treatment law has been infected with
a misunderstanding and misuse of p-values since its
inception, and the Court’s Wal-Mart decision reflects the
consequences of that infection. The Nature article highlights
the pervasiveness of the misunderstanding of p-values, even
in the scientific community, and it serves as a valuable
reminder of the limitations of statistical significance testing.
The misunderstanding of p-values is magnified in
courtrooms. P-values were simply never intended to perform
the tasks that they have been assigned by the Supreme Court
in systemic disparate treatment law. Ronald Fisher would
never have intended for a p-value of .05 in an employment
discrimination case to satisfy the burden of proving that it is
more likely than not that the defendant employer engaged in
a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination.
The time has come for a Bayesian revolution in systemic
disparate treatment law. This Article has demonstrated that
the Bayesian revolution is indeed possible, and that the hard
questions raised by acknowledging the influence of prior
probabilities can be functionally addressed through our civil
justice system, our current rules of civil procedure, and a
careful focus on institutional competence. Although
imperfect estimations of prior probabilities based on flawed
data or educated guesses about the prevalence of
discrimination may be unsatisfying, they are preferable to
the status quo and preferable to ignoring statistical evidence
of employment outcome disparities altogether. This Article
represents only an initial attempt to systematically address
the hard questions that will be presented by switching to
Bayesian analysis of employment statistics, but it is my
fervent hope that it will not be the last such attempt.

After the experiment
A small P value can make
a hypothesis more
plausible, but the
diference may not be
dramatic.

The measured P value
A value of 0.05 is
conventionally deemed
‘statistically signifcant’; a
value of 0.01 is considered
‘very signifcant’.

Before the experiment
The plausibility of the
hypothesis — the odds of
it being true — can be
estimated from previous
experiments, conjectured
mechanisms and other
expert knowledge. Three
examples are shown here.

89% chance of
no real efect

11%
chance of
real efect

P = 0.05

5% chance
of real efect

19-to-1 odds against

THE LONG SHOT

30%

P = 0.01

70%

95% chance of
no real efect

71%

50%

50%

29%

P = 0.05

1-to-1 odds

THE TOSS-UP

89%

P = 0.01

A P value measures whether an observed result can be attributed to chance. But it cannot answer a
researcher’s real question: what are the odds that a hypothesis is correct? Those odds depend on how
strong the result was and, most importantly, on how plausibile the hypothesis is in the frst place.

PROBABLE CAUSE

11%

96%

90%

P = 0.05

4%

10%

THE GOOD BET

9-to-1 odds in favour

99%

P = 0.01

1%

Chance of real efect
Chance of no real efect
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APPENDIX

Copyright Regina Nuzzo (2014). Reprinted with permission from: Regina
Nuzzo, Scientific Method: Statistical Errors, 506 NATURE 151 (Feb. 12, 2014),
available at http://www.nature.com/news/scientific-method-statistical-errors1.14700 (citing Thomas Sellke et al., Calibration of p Values for Testing Precise
Null Hypotheses, 55 AM. STATISTICIAN 62 (2001)).

